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The United States government intends to deploy strategic missile defense (MD) 
capabilities to address an emerging ballistic missile threat.  Many opponents of MD have 
argued that this deployment will incite arms races.  This could pose a serious threat to 
U.S. national security.  This thesis employs arms race theory as an analytical framework 
to assess the potential implications of U.S. MD deployment—focusing in particular on 
the likelihood of arms competition with Russia.  Two questions are explored.  First, what 
drives Russian reactions to U.S. MD?  Second, what are Russian capabilities to engage in 
arms competitions?  Perceptions of U.S. unilateralism play a significant role in Russian 
leaders’ assessments of MD.  Russian concerns, however, appear to be dominated by 
prestige considerations and perceptions of diminishing superpower status.  Although 
Russia possesses some ability to engage America in arms competition, its economic 
limitations are severe.  By enhancing understanding of potential Russian reactions to U.S. 
MD, this thesis identifies ways to minimize the potential for arms competition.  The 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States government intends to deploy strategic missile defense (MD) 
capabilities.  Yet, there is little domestic consensus on either the requirement for MD or 
the effects that a deployment might have.  One of the more dire predictions of MD 
opponents is that U.S. MD will incite arms races with other nations.  Conversely, many 
argue that not moving ahead with MD would increase danger to the American homeland 
and constrain U.S. action overseas due to increasing ballistic missile threats.  The 
consequences of “getting it wrong” could be severe, because the potentially destabilizing 
outcomes of intensified animosities between the United States and powers such as Russia 
could pose a far more serious threat to U.S. national security than the emerging  “rogue 
state” danger. 
This thesis employs arms race theory as an analytical framework to assess some 
of the potential implications of MD deployment for U.S. national security—specifically 
with regard to U.S. MD’s potential to incite arms competitions with Russia.  The thesis 
asks the following questions:  First, what might drive Russia to engage in an arms race in 
response to U.S. MD deployments?  Second, what economic and military capabilities 
does Russia possess to pursue arms competition with the United States?   
A.  FINDINGS 
Key U.S. decisions in the 1990s helped to foster a Russian view that U.S. 
intentions have become increasingly aggressive and hegemonic in nature.  The United 
States-led NATO air operation in the Kosovo conflict in March-June 1999 appears to 
have contributed to Russian perceptions of a growing U.S. threat.  The operation 
exacerbated a belief that Russia had lost its influence in international politics, and 
encouraged the perception (however mistaken) that the United States and its allies in 
NATO were willing to act outside the constraints of international law to achieve their 
political objectives.  
Concomitant with growing Russian apprehensions over U.S. intentions, Russia 
experienced dramatic economic decline in the 1990s.  With an economy faring little 
better today than that of many Third World states, in economic terms Russia has become 
a secondary power.  As other indicators of strength have deteriorated (e.g., economic and 
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diplomatic influence), military strength—in particular, nuclear might—has arguably 
become Russia’s sole remaining claim to superpower status.  To the extent that U.S. MD 
diminishes this bulwark of Russia’s military posture and this last vestige of Russian great 
power status, at least in Russian eyes, MD poses a serious threat to Russia’s national 
security and international standing. 
The potential consequences for U.S. MD deployment that follow from the above 
factors are that:  (a) Russian leaders may mistakenly believe that U.S. MD is aimed at 
neutralizing Russia’s ICBMs and SLBMs; (b) they may therefore assess U.S. MD as a 
threat to Russian security; and (c) they may fear that U.S. MD will threaten Russia’s sole 
remaining claim to superpower status—its nuclear might.  Arms race theory suggests that 
any of these perceptions could create incentives for arms competition. 
Russia’s ability to engage in arms competition is severely limited by its weak 
economy.  It seems unlikely that a large-scale vertical arms race with the United States 
would be possible for Russia in the foreseeable future.  This does not mean that Russia is 
without options.  Of the range of military and diplomatic alternatives available to Russian 
leaders the most likely course would be withdrawal from arms reduction and verification 
regimes in combination with relatively minor adjustments to Russia’s strategic force 
posture (e.g., MIRVing SS-27 ICBMs, retaining some older MIRVed ICBMs and 
enhancing the alert posture). 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS   
Incentives created by misperceptions of aggressive intent, calculations of strategic 
vulnerability, and concerns about national prestige may shape the Russian response to 
U.S. MD.  On balance, the issue of prestige appears to dominate Russian calculations.  It 
is noteworthy, however, that these three incentives are linked to a large degree.  Issues of 
prestige, for example, likely fuel Russian perceptions of U.S. aggressive intentions and 
encourage greater attention to calculations of the strategic balance.  These findings 
suggest three important areas of focus for U.S. MD policy vis-à-vis Russia. 
First, increased clarity and transparency in U.S.-Russian MD discourse are 
essential to curb Russian perceptions of U.S. aggressive intent.  In this regard, diplomatic 
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efforts (e.g., the conference for senior members of the Russian military staff in August 
2001 to better explain U.S. MD architecture and capabilities) are appropriate.   
Second, the extent of U.S. MD deployment should be weighed in light of:  (a) 
U.S. objectives of eliminating threats of coercion, blackmail and attack from nascent 
missile states; and (b) Russia’s concerns over strategic vulnerability.  Although this 
analysis has concluded that it is unlikely that any presently conceived level of U.S. MD 
capability could negate the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent over the coming decade, 
the impact of U.S. MD on Russia’s nuclear capabilities could be significant under certain 
conditions and could increase over time.  This insight suggests that a degree of restraint 
in U.S. MD deployment may be advisable to minimize the potential for adverse Russian 
reactions.  Given the limited technological and material resources of most “rogue states,” 
a balance should be achievable—with respect to U.S. MD deployment levels—to 
reconcile the goals of (a) countering the threat of emerging missile states and (b) pursuing 
enhanced relations with Russia.   
Third, Russian concerns about diminishing international prestige may be partially 
alleviated simply through continued dealings with Russia’s leaders.  The Bush 
Administration has already taken several important steps in this regard.  The July 2001 
G8 Conference in Genoa sent a clear signal that the United States, while resolved to 
pursue MD, views Russian security concerns as important.   
By linking U.S. offensive arms reductions with further MD consultations, the 
above three areas of potential U.S.-Russian compromise are being addressed in parallel 
by the Bush Administration.  First, the focus on increased dialogue and information 
exchanges has likely aided in reducing Russian apprehensions about U.S. intentions.  
Second, U.S. offensive arms reductions in conjunction with MD deployment may serve 
to alleviate Russian perceptions of a growing U.S.-Russian strategic imbalance. Most 
significantly, when U.S. leaders treat Russian leaders as virtually equal partners at the 
bargaining table, they are implicitly recognizing Russia’s major power status. 
It remains to be seen if the present U.S.-Russian consultations will be successful.  
Periods of apparent rapprochement in the past have ended in dispute.  For example, plans 
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for U.S.-Russian cooperation in developing a Global Protection System showed 
significant promise in the early 1990s, but were abandoned by the Clinton 
Administration.  The analysis in this thesis, however, supports the conclusion that the 
Bush Administration’s current strategy for addressing Russian security concerns has 
significant potential for achieving a breakthrough in the highly contentious U.S.-Russian 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
The United States government intends to deploy strategic missile defense (MD) 
capabilities.  The Bush Administration has made it clear that the question is no longer 
whether America will move ahead with MD, but rather how soon and to what extent.1  
Yet, there is little domestic consensus on either the requirement for MD or the effects that 
a deployment might have.  One of the more dire predictions of MD opponents is that U.S. 
MD will incite arms races with other nations.  Conversely, many argue that not moving 
ahead with MD would increase danger to the American homeland and constrain U.S. 
action overseas due to increasing ballistic missile threats.  The debate is not merely an 
academic one.  The consequences of “getting it wrong” could be severe.  The potentially 
destabilizing outcomes of intensified animosities between the United States and powers 
such as Russia could pose a far more serious threat to U.S. national security than the 
emerging  “rogue state” danger.  
This thesis employs arms race theory as an analytical framework to assess some 
of the potential implications of MD deployment for U.S. national security.  The thesis 
focuses on U.S. MD’s potential to incite arms competitions with Russia.   
The use of the term “MD” in the thesis reflects the Bush Administration’s merger 
of the national and theater missile defense concepts.  Describing this change, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated: 
What’s ‘national’ depends on where you live, and what’s ‘theater’ 
depends on where you live.  My interest is in seeing if we can’t find ways 
to develop defenses against ballistic missiles where we have 
interests...And so I’ve pretty much stopped using those words.2 
For the purposes of this thesis, MD will refer only to those missile defense 
systems that have potential strategic capability.  The term “strategic” in missile defense 
matters has historically been a function of range.  In the strategic arms negotiations and 
                                                 
1 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense 
University,” Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1 May 2001 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>. 
2 Lee Ewing, “Why ‘National’ Has Been Dropped From ‘National Missile Defense’,” Aerospace 
Daily, 12 March 2001. 
2 
treaties between Washington and Moscow since 1969, ICBMs and SLBMs with ranges in 
excess of 5,500 km have been deemed “strategic” and thus treaty-accountable. 
The research begins with the following question:  What incentives might drive 
Russia to engage in an arms race in response to U.S. MD deployments?  There is a 
substantial body of literature concerning state incentives in arms competitions.  Robert 
Jervis’s “spiral model”3 provides one theoretical rationale for arms race behavior.  The 
theory is based upon the notion that misperceptions of aggressive intent between nations 
can lead to self-perpetuating cycles of increasing arms and escalating tensions.  This 
model is relevant to the MD discussion because the declaratory policies of Russia today 
indicate beliefs that U.S. MD is aimed at them.  In other words, these beliefs may reflect 
the necessary conditions for development of an arms race spiral. 
However, the thesis also considers potential drivers of arms race behavior beyond 
the action-reaction cycle described by the spiral model.  Colin S. Gray has suggested a 
range of alternatives to explain the phenomenon of arms competition (e.g., institutional 
and domestic pressures, response to aggression, diplomatic objectives, and damage 
limitation).4  Gray argues that states may engage in arms races for reasons of prestige.  
This motive may be particularly important in the Russian case because economic decline 
has left nuclear might as Russia’s sole remaining claim to superpower status.  Since U.S. 
MD capabilities may directly threaten this claim, considerations of international prestige 
and reputation may play a far more important role in determining Russian reactions to 
MD than perceptions of U.S. aggressive intent.   
Gray further suggests that states may engage in arms races to support policy 
preferences (e.g., bureaucratic priorities).  This argument suggests that Russia might 
utilize MD deployment as a rationale for pursuing policies its leaders favor irrespective 
of U.S. actions.  There are some indications this dynamic is occurring in the Russian 
case, particularly in the military-industrial sector.  For example, several Russian military 
officials expressed disappointment with President Clinton’s September 2000 decision to 
                                                 
3 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 64-76. 
4 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26 (January 
1974), 207-233. 
3 
delay deployment of a limited U.S. MD.  They seemed to hope that the “apparent threat” 
of U.S. MD might serve to boost a dramatically reduced military budget.5  Additionally, 
many senior Russian military leaders have reportedly expressed the view that U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be a favorable outcome in that it would allow 
Russia to withdraw from the constraints of arms control agreements such as START I and 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).  As Nikolai Sokov, a leading expert 
on Russian nuclear weapons policy, has stated: 
From the point of view of the [Russian] military, expected withdrawal of 
the United States from the ABM Treaty can provide a welcome pretext, 
and this is part of the reason why some figures in the military leadership 
resist a possible deal on ABM amendments.6 
The logic of crisis stability theory, which has served as a key tenet of U.S. 
thinking about nuclear deterrence, also may be useful in the assessment of prospects for 
arms race activity.  During the Cold War, crisis stability theory examined the impact of 
various U.S. and Soviet force postures on incentives for either side to strike first in times 
of crisis.  In other words, the main consideration was the interaction under various 
scenarios of adversaries with approximately equal offensive capabilities.  If U.S. missile 
defenses could have defeated a Soviet nuclear counterstrike after a U.S. attack, the 
situation would have been considered unstable.  U.S. MD deployments could thus create 
significant pressures for arms competition under certain circumstances: (a) if U.S. MD 
capabilities were so extensive and effective that they could defeat Russia’s nuclear 
forces; and (b) if Russian leaders regarded the hypotheses of crisis stability theory as 
sufficiently persuasive to justify huge expenditures. 
While the interests and incentives driving state decision-making can change 
rapidly, improvements in capabilities typically require more time.  Even if Russia has 
strong incentives to respond to a U.S. MD system, it may lack the necessary resources.  
The second major question the thesis considers is therefore the economic and military 
                                                 
5 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Reactions to NMD Deferral,” The Moscow Times, No. 2039, 7 September 2000. 
6 Nikolai Sokov, “Developments in Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy,” presentation to U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 26 January 2001, 20.  Also see “Press Conference with Vladimir Orlov, Yuri 
Fyodorov and Dmitry Yevstafyev, PIR Center Officials, on RF-US Agenda,” Federal News Service, Inc., 
official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 14 June 2001; or Vitaliy Tsygichko, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
9 June 2001. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, entitled “Academic: Russia Should 
Accept Bush ‘Partnership’ Offer, Counter China ‘Threat’,” 11 June 2001 (FBIS-CEP20010611000096).    
4 
capabilities of Russia.  States with both the incentives and the capacities to adversely 
affect U.S. security are the ones that U.S. leaders must consider with particular care as 
they determine the timing and nature of MD deployments.  Cases in which incentives and 
capabilities do not match up can also provide important guidance on MD policy. 
As part of the assessment presented in this thesis, the extent of U.S. MD 
deployment is varied in light of each element in the analytical framework outlined above.  
Three levels of potential U.S. MD deployment are considered.  The first, a threshold 
missile defense capability, would be able to defend the United States homeland against 
fewer than ten missiles.  The next level of missile defense would approximate the Clinton 
Administration’s expanded “capability 1” system—a single site designed for homeland 
defense against approximately twenty missiles.  Finally, a more extensive deployment, 
equating to the Clinton Administration’s follow-on “capability 3”—a system 
incorporating multiple U.S. land-based sites—will be considered.7  The rationale for 
examining such a range of capabilities is two-fold.  First, the Administration’s plans and 
the likely technological success of a deployed system continue to be uncertain.  
Analyzing a range of capabilities adds flexibility to the assessment, and may enable it to 
accommodate any leadership decision.  Second, the severity of Russia’s response may 
depend heavily upon perceptions of the effectiveness and scale of the United States MD 
deployment.     
It seems a statement of the obvious that Russia may consider more extensive U.S. 
MD capabilities as more threatening.  What is not so obvious perhaps is that the threshold 
for when U.S. MD is deemed a threat will depend on a state’s particular incentives and 
capabilities.  The impact of a limited U.S. MD on Russia’s substantial strategic deterrent 
force is likely to be negligible as compared with its effect on the smaller deterrent force 
of China, for example.  U.S. MD capabilities could hypothetically convince some 
competitors to give up the race.  As an illustration, a “rogue state” could see the ballistic 
missile competition as hopeless if the American MD system was so potent that the buy-in 
cost to the “missile club” was unacceptably high.  An analysis of how Russia’s threshold 
                                                 
7 See United States Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary and Technical Implications of the 
Administration’s Plan for National Missile Defense, by Geoffrey Forden and Raymond Hall, April 2000, 
10 August 2001 <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1984&sequence=0&from=5>; and Appendix A 
for details on MD deployment specifications.    
5 
compares with other states may provide useful indications for the optimization of U.S. 
MD capabilities. 
This thesis does not provide comprehensive and definitive answers to the ongoing 
MD deployment questions.  As the above discussion suggests, many variables are likely 
to influence Russian responses to U.S. MD.  By utilizing an analytical framework that 
focuses on both incentives and capabilities, however, the effort illustrates the 
complexities of the MD deployment decisions facing the United States.  
B.  METHODOLOGY 
The thesis assesses the potential reactions of Russia to U.S. missile defense plans.  
Russian actions, capabilities and inferred interests are weighed in light of arms race 
theories.  The results encompass a range of potential outcomes based upon varying 
degrees of U.S. MD deployment.  Additionally, the thesis identifies potential complex 
interactions between Russia and other states.  In terms of case study selection, Russia was 
chosen because of its crucial role in Eurasian stability and because it remains the only 
nation in the world with the power to destroy America.     
C.  ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of the thesis presents some of the central propositions of arms race 
theories and explains their relevance to the current MD debate.  Strengths and 
weaknesses of the theories are also discussed.  Chapter III consists of the Russian case 
study, and presents an application of the theoretical framework to Russian arms race 
incentives and actual capabilities.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
potential consequences and implications of U.S. MD deployments for U.S.-Russian 
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II.  ARMS RACE THEORIES 
This chapter addresses the incentives potentially driving states’ reactions to a U.S. 
MD deployment.  It is perhaps impossible to understand fully the driving influences 
behind another person’s actions, let alone those of another nation.  The bureaucratic, 
psychological and personal issues behind major policy decisions of states are subjects for 
extensive theoretical debate.  A further complication is that the factors most critical in 
driving a particular decision may be highly contingent upon evolving conditions.  For this 
reason it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer more than an impressionistic analysis 
of the drivers of Russian reactions towards a U.S. MD deployment.   
Given the above caveat, however, an extensive body of theoretical literature on 
arms competitions can be drawn upon to prepare such an analysis.  This chapter describes 
some of the central tenets of the arms race theories that serve as the foundation for the 
case study concerning Russia.  The scope is limited to aspects thought to be particularly 
applicable to arms competition in regard to U.S. MD deployment (e.g., deterrence of 
aggression, issues of prestige, diplomatic and strategic objectives, and assessments of 
strategic balance). 
Colin S. Gray has defined an arms race as a condition “in which there should be 
two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are 
increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective 
military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and 
political behavior of the other parties.”8  Two elements of this definition will be 
emphasized with regard to Russian responses to U.S. MD deployment.  First, the nature 
of the potential adversarial relationship—in terms of threat assessments and/or competing 
interests—needs to be identified to clarify the incentives for arms competition.  It is clear, 
for example, that arms competition does not characterize the force posture interactions 
between closely allied states such as the Untied States and Britain.  Second, there should 
be identifiable objectives (e.g., enhanced security, a stronger military, or additional 
operational options) connected with Russian arms race responses to U.S. MD.  This latter 
                                                 
8 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26 (January 
1974), 208; emphasis in the original.  
8 
element is consistent with Gray’s stipulation that competitors make military force posture 
changes with a “general” attention to the behavior of adversary states. 
A.  DETERRENCE AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
The most familiar rationale for why states engage in arms competition relates to 
perceptions of threats to their national security.  States may adjust their force postures in 
an attempt to deter other states from engaging in harmful activities by raising the 
potential costs of conflict to an unacceptable level.  To the extent that an adversary’s 
actions stem from hostile intent or expansionistic objectives, not to engage in an arms 
competition might actually invite attack from an aggressor.  In this context, arms 
competition can serve an important function by preventing the outbreak of conflict.9   
A somewhat related incentive for arms competition arises from state leaders’ 
desires to achieve the best possible outcome should deterrence against an aggressor fail 
(i.e., in the event of war).10  Defensive strategies such as America’s MD effort reflect 
such an approach.  Many MD advocates view greater emphasis on defensive systems as 
crucial in combating the dangers posed by “rogue states,” due to a belief that such nations 
will not be deterred solely by threats of offensive retaliation.  Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen expressed this view in July 1999 when he stated, “Welcome to the grave 
New World of terrorism...a world in which traditional notions of deterrence and counter-
response no longer apply.”11  U.S. leaders therefore seek to minimize the effects of an 
attack should their efforts to deter fail—in the best case entirely defeating the use of 
ballistic missiles by “rogue states” as tools of coercion or punishment.   
It is clear that without hostilities, or some expectation thereof, the above 
justifications for arms races lack relevance.  Given the United States government’s 
assertion that MD is only directed at “rogue states,” the question of factors driving 
Russian leaders’ declared perceptions to the contrary needs to be addressed.  
                                                 
9 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26 (January 
1974), 210. 
10 Ibid., 211. 
11 William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grave New World,” The Washington Post, 26 July 1999: A19.  
See also George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense 
University,” Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1 May 2001 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>. 
9 
1.  Spiral Model 
Why might Russia consider U.S. MD deployment as threatening, when from a 
U.S. perspective missile defenses represent a non-aggressive approach to strategic 
security vis-à-vis “rogue states”?  Robert Jervis has suggested that misperceptions of 
aggressive intent are common in inter-state relations, and often play a defining role in 
inciting arms competitions.12  Four characteristics underlying state interactions help to 
explain this phenomenon.  The first characteristic stems from the notion that inter-state 
political interactions occur in an anarchic setting.  Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan 
that the natural condition of man is characterized by competition and war. 
...if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot 
both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End...endeavor 
to destroy, or subdue one another...And from this diffidence of one 
another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as 
Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he 
can, so long, till he sees no other power great enough to endanger 
him...Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is 
called Warre...13 
Hobbes suggests that the formation of governed societies allowed escape from this 
miserable and anarchic existence.  According to Hobbes, the function of sovereigns (or 
governments) is to establish and enforce common laws, practices and mores, and thereby 
to regulate the cooperative behavior of individuals within society for mutual benefit.  
Nation-states can be seen as providing such a function today for individuals. 
However, in inter-state interactions there is no commonly accepted sovereign to 
guide cooperative behavior.  While the Charter of the United Nations (UN) states that the 
Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security” (Article 24), the UN Charter acknowledges that the Security Council may 
not be able to fulfill this responsibility.  According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
                                                 
12 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 64-76. 
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 
1991), first published in 1651, 87-88. 
10 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”14  Consequently, states must on occasion defend their interests by forceful 
means rather than through adjudication by a higher authority.  This creates a condition in 
which state interactions often assume the characteristics of Hobbes’s anarchic world. 
...yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of 
their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and 
posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed 
on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers 
of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbors, which is a 
posture of War.15   
Such a condition encourages leaders to make cautious assumptions about the intentions of 
others because the results of mistaken judgments could prove fatal. 
Second, practical barriers to understanding may complicate inter-state relations.  
Because states interact in an anarchic world, they are reluctant to conduct completely 
transparent discourse.  States withhold critical information, act in secrecy, and maneuver 
for bargaining position at all times to remain competitive.  Barriers imposed by differing 
values, history and even language may also impair inter-state understanding.  Such an 
effect may be relevant to U.S.-Russian relations, in view of the cultural and historical 
differences.   
A third characteristic of inter-state relations is psychological.  Jervis argues that 
people tend to interpret others’ actions based upon their own beliefs and values.  This 
effect may be particularly strong in an environment in which the information is 
ambiguous and uncertain, such as the international diplomatic arena.  Moreover, once an 
image of another state’s actions has been formulated, subsequent ambiguous information 
about that state tends to be interpreted in light of that image.16  Thus, nations on friendly 
terms will often forgive one another’s harmful policies or actions as mistakes, while 
adversary nations often interpret even benign actions as hostile in intent. 
                                                 
14 United Nations Charter cited in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Role in 
International Security (Washington, DC: United Institute of Peace Press, 1998) 19-20. 
15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 
1991), first published in 1651, 90. 
16 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 68. 
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The final characteristic, which is related to the third, is that it is often difficult for 
state leaders to appreciate the concerns and interests of other states.  Herbert Butterfield 
describes this dynamic: 
It is the peculiar characteristic of the…Hobbesian fear…that you yourself 
may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you 
cannot enter the other man’s counter-fear…For you know that you 
yourself mean him no harm…and it is never possible for you to realize or 
remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he 
can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have.17 
If U.S. leaders believe their intentions in seeking MD to be clear—that is, to gain 
protection against small attacks by “rogue states”—they may discount Russian objections 
to MD. 
The basic pattern that results from the four characteristics outlined above—what 
Jervis has dubbed the “spiral model”— is that a state that increases its ability to defend 
itself creates two outcomesone good, one bad.  Initially this state becomes more secure, 
because it has improved its military capabilities.  But this state’s increased security 
decreases the security of competing states in turn because they view power relationships 
as a zero-sum game.  Competitor states, feeling thus endangered, will then seek to 
increase their own military capabilities to meet the perceived threat of the first state.  The 
result is to negate any added security the first state had achieved, while escalating the 
overall level of distrust.  One manifestation of this self-perpetuating cycle of escalatory 
behavior is an arms race.  
Application of the spiral model to the United States MD deployment question 
suggests that the following dynamic could occur.  First, U.S. leaders know that they are 
only deploying MD to counter the threat of “rogue” states.  From this viewpoint, then, 
Russia has no reason to feel threatened by U.S. MD.  Second, because U.S. intentions on 
MD are believed to be clear, any negative reactions by Russian leaders (including their 
current political declarations) may either not be taken seriously or considered as 
unwarranted agitation against U.S. interests.  This might then precipitate further U.S. 
actions (e.g., unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty).  Finally, the Russians, having 
                                                 
17 Herbert Butterfield quoted in Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International 
Politics (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976) 69. 
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believed that the United States MD program was calculated from the start to magnify 
U.S. military strengths, will respond with further actions (e.g., arms investments, 
coalitions).  In a worst-case scenario this cycle would continue as each side escalates in 
response to the other until at last major hostilities occur. 
Elements in the present international MD debate suggest that perceptual 
distortions—as outlined above—may play an important role in Russian (and Chinese) 
responses to U.S. MD.  Talking points from a July 2001 White House policy guidance 
paper to U.S. embassies summarize the Bush Administration’s intentions regarding MD, 
and are reminiscent of the language of the spiral model. 
We [the United States] have said all along that we seek missile defenses to 
deal with the threat of blackmail and terror by rogue states...Defense 
procurement is a very transparent process in the United States.  The 
limited scale of long-range missile defenses we seek will be clear to 
all...The limited missile defense that we will deploy would not in any way 
undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those 
reportedly being contemplated by Russia.  With regard to China, we do not 
view China as an enemy, and our limited missile defenses are not directed 
at it.  Furthermore, missile defenses are not provocative.  These purely 
defensive weapons can only be used to defeat an incoming missile 
launched by an aggressor or a missile launched by accident.18 
In contrast, Russian and Chinese leaders have repeatedly declared they do not see 
U.S. intentions as transparent or benign.  The July 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty on Good 
Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation stated in part: 
Russia and China uphold the strict observance of generally recognized 
principles and norms of international law against any actions aimed at 
exerting pressure or interfering...with the internal affairs of sovereign 
states...Taiwan is an integral part of China...Russia and China stress the 
basic importance of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty...[and] speak out for 
maintaining the treaty in its current form.19   
                                                 
18 “Administration Missile Defense Papers,” White House cable, 11 July 2001. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Homepage, 26 July 2001 
<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/EmbassyCableMD.html>; emphasis added.  
19 See “In the Treaty’s Words: ‘International Stability’,” New York Times on the Web, 11 July 2001, 
10 August 2001; and Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia and China Sign ‘Friendship’ Treaty,” New York Times on 
the Web, 17 July 2001, 10 August 2001 <http://partners.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/i.../17RUSS.html>. 
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The Treaty further promises Sino-Russian consultations in response to pressure or 
aggression from another power.  While not directly stated, it is clear that many of the 
issues identified in the treaty are directly aimed at U.S. MD policy initiatives.20 
Such declarations imply that Moscow and Beijing hold perceptions consistent 
with a spiral model explanation for arms competition.  Specifically, they form a picture of 
the United States discounting the security concerns of other nations because: (a) it 
assumes its intentions are clearly understood; and (b) it therefore fails to recognize the 
threatening appearance of its policies in the eyes of states planning according to 
Hobbesian assumptions. 
Weaknesses in the spiral model may degrade its predictive value in certain cases.  
The model applies with greater relevance when assessing the behavior of status quo 
powers.  It tends to lose value when analyzing states with genuinely aggressive 
objectives.21  A blatant example of this shortcoming of the concept may be found in the 
pre-World War II conciliatory behavior of Britain and France vis-à-vis Nazi Germany.  
Repeated attempts to understand and accommodate the stated security concerns of Adolf 
Hitler led to a series of concessions specifically aimed at avoiding an escalation of 
antagonism and subsequent spiral-type behavior.  As was subsequently demonstrated, 
however, Hitler’s objectives were not to maintain the status quo or to satisfy limited 
demands, but rather to seek dominance in Europe and beyond.  With such aims, each 
concession to Germany was seen by Hitler as proof of British and French weakness, and 
an opening for further conquests.  Advocates of deterrence theory would argue that 
strength and resistance were required to check such an aggressor. 
This insight may be relevant to the current MD discussion.  For example, if 
current Chinese resistance to U.S. MD is actually more a function of Beijing’s long-term 
objectives to dominate the Asian-Pacific region, rather than stated concerns about U.S. 
hegemony,22 an appropriate response for U.S. policy might be the deployment of missile 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 84-85. 
22 “China: Who’s real threat to world peace?” China Daily, 5 July 2001; or see Jiang Zemin, 
“Statement by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Millennium Summit of the 
United Nations,” 7 September 2000, 12 August 2001 <http://ww.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5849.html>.  
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defenses as a deterrent.  Not to deploy MD could encourage further Chinese ambitions in 
much the same way as French and British restraint incited Nazi Germany’s ambitions.  
The conclusions of the spiral model, however, would lead to greater U.S. restraint in 
deploying missile defenses to avoid Chinese perceptions of U.S. hegemonic intentions—
i.e., precisely the opposite recommendation of deterrence theory.   
In assessing the Russian case, however, there are several reasons why the above 
weakness of the spiral model may not apply.  First, trends in the Russian military over the 
last decade have, if anything, been towards force structure reductions and a slower 
operational tempo.  Even the actions within Russia’s frontiers, such as the operations in 
Chechnya, have been challenging for the Russian armed forces.  Second, Russia does not 
appear to possess sufficient economic means to pursue territorial expansion in the 
foreseeable future, even if it preferred such a course.     
2.  Crisis Stability 
The theory of crisis stability is customarily connected with notions of threat 
assessment—particularly with regard to nuclear weapons.  The precise meaning of the 
term crisis stability has varied in the literature over the years.  During the Cold War the 
term was most often utilized in the context of the American-Soviet strategic nuclear 
relationship, and referred to the impact various force postures might have on incentives to 
strike first in times of crisis.  In other words, the main consideration was the dynamics of 
the offense-defense relationship between adversaries with approximately equal 
capabilities.  Three scenarios that could occur between Russia and the United States with 
regard to U.S. MD deployment are illustrative of this concept, and further highlight 
potential incentives for arms competition arising from U.S. MD.  These are extreme 
hypothetical scenarios and inherently implausible conjectures owing to the great risks in 
any operational use of nuclear weapons.  
The first case is the status quo.  At present the United States possesses no strategic 
MD system while Russia maintains a system capable of providing very limited protection 
of its capital city of Moscow.  With today’s offense-defense relationship, each side 
retains the capability to retaliate and cause unacceptable damage after absorbing a first-
strike from the other.  Stability is maintained because U.S. and Russian vulnerability to 
unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange is assured.  In other words, the costs of 
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conflict are so high that both states are deterred from aggressive action.  This describes 
the condition sometimes called mutual assured destruction (MAD). 
A second scenario would be one in which the United States begins deploying a 
moderate MD system while Russia maintains its current force posture.  Depending upon 
Russian perceptions of the relative capabilities of U.S. MD vis-à-vis its own offensive 
nuclear force, Russia may well believe that the growing imbalance will eventually 
degrade its strategic deterrent capability, giving the United States increased flexibility 
and incentives to strike first.  The reason why U.S. incentives to strike first might 
increase in this situation derives from the notion that a temporary window of opportunity 
for U.S. adventurism would open due to the escalation dominance MD would confer.  If 
no U.S. attack took place, however, this window could close as Russia adjusted its own 
force posture to reestablish U.S. vulnerability.  The notion that the United States would 
attack Russia under today’s circumstances may seem ludicrous to U.S. decision-makers.  
However, as was discussed with the spiral model, states guided by Hobbesian 
assumptions typically resort to capabilities-based planning and worst-case interpretations 
of the behavior of their rivals. 
During the transition to such a U.S. defense system, therefore, Russian leaders 
may perceive incentives to hedge against the developing imbalances.  In the worst case, 
Russian leaders might have increased incentives to strike first before the United States 
was able to fully deploy MD and establish a strategic advantage.  Such an attack would 
be extremely implausible, however, because of its suicidal consequences for Russia.  
Another option could be to tolerate the imbalance, thus accepting a diminished ability to 
influence future U.S. actions through nuclear threats, at least in some circumstances.  In 
this case, Russian leaders would essentially have to have greater confidence in America’s 
restraint.  Lastly, Russia might try to match the evolving U.S. capabilities by improving 
its offensive forces to overcome a U.S. defensive system and/or by counterbalancing with 
equivalent strategic defense capabilities of its own (i.e., engage in arms competition).  
Once the United States MD capabilities were deployed, the uncertainty created by U.S. 
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defenses would undoubtedly play into Russian decision-making.  The likely result would 
be to reduce first-strike incentives and to reestablish crisis stability.23   
In a third hypothetical case both Russia and the United States would have 
established substantial MD systems.  Even in this instance, however, instability could 
occur.  Depending upon perceptions of the offense-defense balance, either side might 
believe that by attacking first it could reduce the enemy’s offensive capabilities to such a 
degree that the subsequent “ragged retaliation” would be survivable.24   
The changed post-Cold War context calls into question the usefulness of crisis 
stability theory in this analysis of arms race incentives.  Today’s relationship between 
Washington and Moscow differs from that during the Cold War era, in that levels of 
animosity have significantly diminished.   
A second problem with application of crisis stability theory to the MD debate 
concerns the level of effectiveness of MD.  A key assertion of U.S. MD advocates, 
particularly as it relates to Russia, is that MD poses no conceivable threat to crisis 
stability because Russian strategic nuclear forces could easily overcome any planned U.S. 
MD system.  However, Moscow may believe that U.S. MD will work very well, even if 
this belief is incorrect.  America is the world’s technological leader, and the fear of a 
rapid expansion of U.S. MD capabilities after an initial deployment is apparent in some 
Russian assessments.  In other words, Russian perceptions of U.S. MD’s eventual 
capability may be more important than U.S. MD’s demonstrable capacity in the near-
term.  Although a limited U.S. MD might pose little threat to Russian arsenals initially, 
the effect of U.S. MD over time could increase with continued investments.  These 
considerations could lead states once again to alarming interpretations of the impact of a 
U.S. MD deployment. 
A more fundamental problem with crisis stability theory, as well as with the other 
arms race incentives addressed thus far, is that it potentially oversimplifies arms 
competition.  That is, it depicts a process of action and reaction in which perceptions of 
                                                 
23 Weinberg, Alvin and Jack Barkenbus, Strategic Defenses and Arms Control (New York: Paragon 
House Publishers, 1988) 102. 
24 Wilkening, Dean and Kenneth Watman, Strategic Defenses and First-Strike Stability (Santa 
Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 1986) v. 
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threat and precise calculations of the strategic balance are the crucial drivers.  As 
previously noted, however, many variables beyond such a straightforward appraisal may 
influence arms race behavior. 
B.  ALTERNATIVES 
1.  Diplomacy 
Nuclear weapons have played an important role in defining state power for over 
fifty years.  It is noteworthy that the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council are also the top five nuclear weapons states.  States may pursue strategic 
weapons in order to attain increased diplomatic weight in international politics.25  The 
pursuit of costly ballistic missile programs by economically impoverished states such as 
North Korea may be illustrative of this driver of arms competition.   
Because U.S. MD may threaten the leverage states obtain from their ballistic 
missile programs, strong incentives to counter U.S. MD may be generated.  For example, 
a foundation of Russia’s diplomatic influence and power projection in the world has been 
its military potential.  In the face of severe economic and conventional military decline 
(i.e., as other measures of international power have diminished), Russian leaders must 
now rely on nuclear might to an even greater extent in diplomacy and security.  Although 
it is unlikely that any level of U.S. MD in the near-term could defend America and its 
allies against the numbers of missiles Russia could bring to bear, the political impact of 
U.S. MD deployments in this regard could be significant.   
Furthermore, Russia has sought to link threats of withdrawal from existing arms 
control and non-proliferation regimes to U.S. MD.  The carrying out of such threats 
would essentially equate to arms competition with the United States—though in a less 
direct way than traditional notions of a “vertical” offensive weapons buildup.  Promoting 
missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation by other states would 
constitute a “horizontal” form of arms competition by Russia.  In this context, then, 
Russia could be seen as utilizing the threat of arms competition to achieve diplomatic 
objectives in other areas—U.S. offensive arms reductions, for example. 
                                                 
25 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26 (January 
1974), 214-216. 
18 
2.  Reputation 
The maintenance of state reputation also can be an important incentive for arms 
competition.26  A state’s prestige (i.e., relative standing in the international community) 
is a function of numerous factors.  Economic and military powers are two of the most 
important considerations.  Such factors can be instrumental in allowing states a seat at the 
international bargaining table.  In the case of North Korea, for example, it could be 
argued that disproportionate attention is being paid to North Korean leaders largely as a 
function of North Korea’s military potential—in particular, its ballistic missile program. 
Some of the changes since the Cold-War era help to illustrate this notion of 
prestige.  Until the early 1990s, the prominence of the Soviets and the Americans in 
world politics gave them preponderant influence with their respective allies and security 
partners.  A measure of the importance of this bi-polar arrangement to Soviet leaders was 
the maintenance of the arms competition with America in the face of the USSR’s 
impending economic collapse.  Today, Russia’s arsenal remains substantial but is 
deteriorating at a rapid pace.  The impact of U.S. MD on the Russian-U.S. strategic 
balance may exacerbate this power diminution.  In this light, Russians may fear that U.S. 
MD will play a critical role in eroding Russia’s last remaining claim to superpower 
status—its nuclear might.  This fear could be an element in a Russian decision to engage 
the United States in an arms competition. 
3.  Convenience 
Gray has argued that states may engage in arms competition because “an external 
pacer of military endeavor is both convenient and necessary to the racing agents.”27  Such 
an incentive for arms competition could play a role at several levels.  At the level of the 
state leadership, increased military strength may be a goal for reasons not directly related 
to the declared justification for arms buildup.  Russian leaders might use arguments of a 
U.S. threat (e.g., U.S. MD deployment) to rationalize expansion of military defense 
budgets and withdrawal from expensive or irksome treaty obligations.  Such arguments 
might prove particularly appealing in the present state of fiscal austerity in the Russian 
military. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 224-227. 
27 Ibid., 216-219. 
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Although this thesis does not extensively analyze intra-state actors (i.e., 
bureaucratic or institutional actors) potentially driving Russian responses to U.S. MD, it 
is important to note their role.  Some military elites appear to have an interest in 
identifying threats that are supportive of desired force structure, budget or acquisition 
objectives.  For example, several key Russian military leaders expressed disappointment 
with President Clinton’s September 2000 decision to delay deployment of a limited U.S. 
MD.  They appeared to hope that the “apparent threat” of U.S. MD might serve to boost a 
dramatically declined military budget.28   
Organizational inertia—fostered by standard operating procedures—in the 
Russian military could also play an important role in driving such a reaction.  If Russian 
military leaders are accustomed to traditional concepts of strategic deterrence (owing to 
decades of force planning), they may be in search of a familiar mission.  The argument 
that the United States military force structure is still planned and configured for an 
environment that no longer exists (i.e., the Cold War) is also reminiscent of this concept 
of organizational inertia. 
Arms competition also may support the purposes of the political constituencies 
served by the state’s military-industrial complex.  One need look no further than 
American ship construction to understand how such forces can exert a powerful influence 
over political decision-making.  The city of Newport News, Virginia, survives to a great 
extent as a function of the profitability of Newport News Shipbuilding.  A major part of 
this company’s profits hinge upon a routine level of nuclear aircraft carrier overhauls and 
new construction.  Over the last decade, the wisdom of retaining large aircraft carriers as 
the keystone of the United States Navy has repeatedly come under challenge.  Companies 
such as Newport News Shipbuilding can bring powerful political forces to bear in 
resisting such challenges.  Gray has argued, however, that the empirical evidence is 
lacking to support a claim that a state’s military-industrial complex can be the initiator of 
arms competition or war.29  As a factor influencing the rate and inertia of inter-state arms 
competitions, however, such considerations may be significant. 
                                                 
28 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Reactions to NMD Deferral,” The Moscow Times, No. 2039, 7 September 
2000. 
29 Colin S. Gray, “The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” World Politics, 26 (January 
1974), 221. 
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C.  CONCLUSIONS 
Russian reactions to U.S. MD might be influenced by domestic factors as much as 
by purposeful leadership decisions.  The argument for concentrating the analysis at the 
leadership level is based upon two considerations.  First, based upon the declaratory 
policies of Russia’s leaders, U.S. MD is perceived as having the potential to harm 
Russian national security interests.  Such consequences would most likely draw key 
leaders into the decision-making process.  Second, responses to U.S. MD (e.g., force 
posture adjustments associated with an arms race) would likely demand a significant 
commitment of state resources.  Here, also, state leaders would likely play an active role.  
There is considerable evidence of direct leadership involvement in the MD debate.  The 
efforts of President Vladimir Putin to stop U.S. MD (e.g., UN Conference on 
Disarmament talks, extensive travel throughout Eurasia and the July 2001 Sino-Russian 
Friendship Treaty) illustrate this point.  Although the focus on leadership decision-
making is considered sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, the discussion highlights 
the need for further research regarding intra-state dynamics to fully assess the potential 
for U.S. MD to incite arms competitions with Russia. 
No straightforward quantitative methodology can be applied to the analysis of 
incentives driving arms competitions.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, Russian 
leaders’ perceptions of U.S. MD policy are an inherently subjective and uncertain matter.  
In fact, the spiral model would suggest that the leaders themselves are not fully aware of 
their own biases and perceptions.  Second, due to a lack of access to the personal 
reflections of the state leaders it cannot be concluded with reasonable certainty whether 
their public statements correspond to their actual beliefs or are merely political posturing.  
The approach taken in subsequent chapters assumes that the public statements and 
international activities of the leaders reflect a “true” picture of their perceptions of U.S. 
missile defense. 
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III.  RUSSIA 
The present opposition of Russian leaders to U.S. MD may seem perplexing from 
an American perspective.  U.S. leaders do not view Russia as the target of MD 
deployment, and have repeatedly declared that the primary purpose of an MD system is 
to address the evolving threat of “rogue states.”  Furthermore, many analysts judge it is 
unlikely that any level of MD deployment could negate the substantial Russian strategic 
nuclear deterrent in the near term.  Lastly, U.S. MD advocates note that fundamental 
improvements in U.S.-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union have made 
the notion of U.S.-Russian conflict remote.  In a May 2001 address at the United States 
National Defense University, President Bush stated, “Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s 
Soviet Union.  Its government is no longer Communist.  Its president is elected.  Today’s 
Russia is not our [America’s] enemy.”30 From the American perspective, then, Russian 
leaders appear to have little to fear from a U.S. MD deployment. 
Why, then, do Russian leaders assert that U.S. MD poses a threat to their national 
security, and will incite an arms competition?  This chapter examines three major 
categories of Russian objections to MD in light of specific arms race theories discussed in 
Chapter II.  First, the declarations and diplomatic activities of Russian leaders have 
repeatedly suggested that they view U.S. behavior as increasingly hegemonic.  The 
pattern of discourse that has developed between U.S. and Russian leaders with regard to 
MD illustrates this Russian perspective and is reminiscent of the language of the spiral 
model.  Second, Russia’s economic decline over the last decade has necessitated major 
reductions in its military forces.  Because the United States is developing MD while 
Russia does not possess the resources to expand its offensive forces, Russian leaders 
likely fear the long-term potential for MD to degrade their strategic deterrent.  Lastly, 
Russia’s declining economic and military strength has led to a greater reliance upon 
nuclear weapons for defense (because nuclear forces are less expensive to maintain than 
conventional forces), and has arguably left nuclear might as Russia’s sole claim to 
superpower status.  In this context, MD poses a direct challenge to Russia’s security 
strategy and prestige. 
                                                 
30 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense 
University,” Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1 May 2001 
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A common thread appears to link the issues outlined above.  It is that Russian 
leaders’ concerns over MD are tied to their increasing sense of vulnerability and 
diminished international standing.  These concerns are in turn inextricably linked to 
Russia’s economic hardships.  This interpretation helps identify means to minimize the 
potential for Russia to respond to MD through arms competition.  The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of U.S. policy options in this regard.    
A.  INCENTIVES FOR ARMS COMPETITION 
1.  Perceptions of Aggression and the Spiral Model 
“NMD is about American strategic hegemony in the world,” stated Alexei 
Pushkov of the Presidential Foreign Policy Council in Moscow. “Even if I am wrong, this 
is how it is perceived all over the world, and perceptions here [in Russia] are much more 
important than reality.”31  Russian leaders’ assertions that U.S. MD plans derive from 
aggressive intentions have become a common theme in the current debate.  Equally 
common are U.S. declarations that American intentions are benign and that Russia is 
merely posturing.  For instance, Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) has stated he is convinced that 
Russia’s leaders “can and will understand that America’s intent on missile defense is not 
to create an arms race.  The Russians believe in missile defense because they know the 
threats [posed by rogue states] are real.”32   
The spiral model would suggest that such extreme differences in images of the 
other side could form the necessary conditions for arms competition.  There are two 
important questions to ask in assessing the spiral model’s applicability to U.S.-Russian 
relations regarding MD.  First, what is the basis for Russian beliefs that the United States 
harbors aggressive intentions?  Second, to what extent does the character and language of 
the current MD debate encourage spiral type behavior?   
To address the first question one may look to two basic trends of the post-Cold 
War era that might have contributed to Russian perceptions of strategic vulnerability and 
U.S. hegemonic objectives.  The first trend has been a loss of Russian economic and 
                                                 
31 Pushkov quoted in Scott Peterson, “Moscow’s Offense Against US Missile Defense,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, 14 March 2001. 
32 Curt Weldon, “Defense of America’s Homeland,” address to the House of Representatives, 
Federation of American Scientists Homepage, 02 May 2001, 05 September 2001 
<http://fas.org/news/usa/2001/usa-010502a.htm>. 
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military capability.  The second trend, likely working to amplify the impact of the first, 
has been an increase (from the Russian perspective) in U.S. unilateralism and disregard 
for Russian security concerns.  These two trends have arguably helped generate a 
growing tension amongst Russian elites between (a) desires to counter U.S. activities, and 
(b) an increasing inability to do so due to fiscal realities.    
In the early 1990s, Russian leaders had reason to believe that they could maintain 
a somewhat equal political and strategic partnership with the United States.  There had 
been significant progress in arms control (e.g., the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE), the 1991 START I agreement, and the 1993 START II agreement), 
which helped limit fiscal pressures on Russian leaders by allowing for the possibility of 
needed force reductions.  Also, Russian concerns over the possibility of NATO expansion 
appeared to be addressed by the Partnership for Peace program, which—at least at the 
beginning in 1993-1994—seemed to indicate that NATO would not be taking in new 
members in the near term. 
Moreover, in the area of MD, there was a brief period of convergence between 
United States and Russian policies in the early 1990s.  As Stephen Hadley has pointed 
out, in January 1991 President George H.W. Bush’s Administration shifted the focus of 
MD from the expansive aims embodied in President Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) to a somewhat more limited capability to address “third-country attacks 
and also...accidental or unauthorized launch from a nuclear power”—the so-called Global 
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system.  The lessons of the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War with regard to the emerging ballistic missile threat, combined with the August 1991 
attempted coup in the Soviet Union (which highlighted the potential instability of control 
over Russia’s nuclear arsenal), were probably factors in the formulation of these U.S. MD 
initiatives.  Significantly, in January 1992, President Boris Yeltsin announced at the 
United Nations that Russia was willing to jointly develop, create and operate a global 
system of defense against ballistic missiles, a concept Moscow and Washington later 
termed a Global Protection System (GPS).  GPS was envisioned as including early-
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warning data sharing, coordinated missile defense operations, and technical 
cooperation.33  In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin approved a joint declaration: 
The two Presidents agree that their two nations should work together with 
allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system 
[GPS] as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.34 
However, this cooperation was short-lived.  The Clinton Administration rapidly 
reversed course on Global Protection System negotiations and significantly scaled back 
funding for U.S. MD research programs in 1993.  At the same time, the Administration 
withdrew treaty amendment proposals that might have opened the door for U.S. MD 
deployments.  Furthermore, protocols were added to the ABM Treaty to include the 
newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine as parties.  This was 
expected to make future ABM Treaty amendments more difficult.35  Several joint U.S.-
Russian declarations subsequently reaffirmed commitment to the ABM Treaty as a 
“cornerstone of strategic stability.”36  In short, much of the political groundwork that had 
been laid for Russian acceptance of a U.S. MD system during the Bush Administration 
was discarded by the Clinton Administration, which had different priorities, particularly 
in the period from January 1993 to January 1999. 
Russia has encountered severe economic decline since 1991.  One effect of this 
decline has been a reduction in military strength.  An indication of the degree of hardship 
suffered is that by 1997 over two million people in the Russian armed services and 
defense industry had to share a combined annual budget equivalent to approximately one-
fourth the funding of the United States Army.37  That same year, Igor Rodionov, then the 
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Russian Minister of Defense, publicly declared that Russia’s protracted economic crisis 
threatened to reduce the armed forces to nothing by 2003, and that even the strategic 
nuclear forces were in a state of near-total collapse.38  Although such statements may 
have been cast in dramatic terms to gain political support in defense budget battles, they 
highlight the impression that military weakness was becoming a serious concern of 
Russian elites.  Such concerns undoubtedly played a significant role in fostering a 
growing sense of Russian vulnerability in the political and strategic environment.    
Events in the 1990s highlighted growing Russian weaknesses and began to call 
U.S. intentions into question in Russian eyes.  Russian leaders’ assessments of NATO 
decisions influenced by the United States have arguably played a major role in shaping 
Russian national policy and views of U.S. actions.  
As early as 1994, indications that the United States would move ahead with 
NATO expansion began to emerge.  President Clinton stated at a news conference with 
central European leaders in Prague in January 1994 that, “While the Partnership [for 
Peace] is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room.  It changes the 
entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on 
new members, but when and how.”39   
The impact of America’s decision to move ahead with NATO enlargement was 
apparent in President Boris Yeltsin’s comments at a 1994 Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe summit.  In response to statements by President Clinton that “no 
country outside [NATO] will be allowed to veto expansion,” President Yeltsin declared 
that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is 
risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.”40  More recently, President Putin 
expressed the Russian view of enlargement as follows: 
The problem should be simple.  In the West, everyone says ‘We don’t 
want new divisions in Europe, we don’t want new Berlin walls.’  Good.  
We completely agree.  But when NATO enlarges, division doesn’t 
disappear, it simply moves towards our borders.  NATO should be 
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disbanded as was the Warsaw Pact, but that is not even taken into 
consideration.41 
To the extent that the eastward migration of NATO’s frontiers is removing the 
buffer between Russian territory and that of the Western allies, many Russians see NATO 
enlargement as a potential threat to Russian security.  Beyond enlargement, however, 
Russians have argued that the character of NATO’s mission has changed in fundamental 
ways that directly reinforce U.S. hegemony.  Specifically, the United States-led NATO 
operation in the Kosovo conflict in March-June 1999 was a defining moment for Russian 
perceptions of a growing U.S. threat.   
Celeste Wallander of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has 
suggested that, although Russian leaders were uneasy about the implications of NATO 
enlargement in the 1990s, there was an underlying acceptance of the fact because Russian 
leaders “believed that the United States and NATO had committed themselves to 
adopting non-collective defense missions only with a United Nations mandate.”42  In 
other words, Russian leaders’ concerns were partially alleviated by an assumption that 
Russia yet held a veto over NATO’s non-Article 5 activities through its seat on the UN 
Security Council.  That the campaign proceeded without the benefit of a UN Security 
Council mandate undoubtedly fueled Russian fears of growing U.S. assertiveness.   
Russian diplomatic reactions to the campaign were complex, shifting from initial 
strong opposition to NATO’s operation to a more pragmatic slant of accommodation.  A 
Chinese analysis of this change in policy stated, “On the one hand the government 
adopted a series of hardline postures in order to stabilize Russian feelings, and at the 
same time it considered that Russia lacked the economic strength to take part in any 
large-scale military action [to oppose NATO’s actions].”  The analysis argued that two 
U.S. actions key in Russia’s eventual cooperation with NATO were: (a) U.S. efforts to 
encourage Russian participation provided some acknowledgement of Russia’s major 
power status; and (b) the United States linked economic aid to Russia with Russia’s 
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policy towards the Kosovo campaign.43  From this perspective, given little say in 
NATO’s decision to intervene in the Kosovo conflict, Russian leaders’ cooperation 
represented an attempt to salvage what they could from an uncomfortable situation.  The 
road to compromise in this example may well have implications for potential U.S.-
Russian compromise over MD. 
Regardless of Russia’s eventual uneasy compromise with NATO, the Russian 
experience in Kosovo clearly had an adverse effect on the attitudes of Russian leaders 
towards U.S. policies.  Operation Allied Force indicated that Russia’s seat on the UN 
Security Council no longer assured it a leading role in issues of strategic import.  Also, 
NATO’s Kosovo intervention helped to validate Russian suspicions that U.S. leaders no 
longer valued Russia as a major force in world politics.  The humanitarian justification 
for the intervention probably conjured fears, however unrealistic, of U.S. intervention in 
Russian affairs (e.g., in Chechnya).  Most importantly, Kosovo demonstrated a 
willingness by the United States (in the Russian view) to be unconstrained by 
international law and to act unilaterally in opposition to Russian interests.  In short, the 
Kosovo “lessons” helped reinforce Russian views that U.S. intentions towards Russia 
were not benign.  Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma’s Defense 
Committee, summed up the new Russian perspective as follows: 
Now, everything has changed...After the war in the Balkans, there was no 
more talk of detargetting [the United States].  The Duma and the executive 
branch drafted a law for long-term allocations for the strategic 
forces...Moscow now regards NATO as an opponent if not an enemy.44 
Practical indicators of the seriousness with which the Russians considered the 
“lessons” of Kosovo can be seen in two ways.  First, there were distinctive changes in 
2000 to Russia’s foreign policy objectives as declared in The Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation that directly reflect Russian angst over U.S. policies. 
There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure 
of the world with the economic and power domination of the United 
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States...Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international 
relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world...Attempts 
to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as “humanitarian 
intervention” and “limited sovereignty” in order to justify unilateral power 
actions bypassing the UN Security Council are not acceptable.45 
Second, the Russian national security concept in January 2000 explicitly included 
an expanded potential for nuclear weapons use, from repelling threats against “the very 
existence of the Russian Federation,” to “repelling an armed aggression...if all other 
measures of resolving the crisis have been exhausted.”46  The new approach was clearly 
played out in military exercises conducted in the summer of 1999.  For instance, the 
Zapad-99 exercise simulated an attack on Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast by NATO forces.  
In the event, Russian conventional forces were assessed as unable to resist NATO.  The 
NATO attack was ultimately repelled by use of limited nuclear Air Launched Cruise 
Missile (ALCM) strikes against European and U.S. targets.  According to the exercise 
conclusions, the damage caused by these attacks, combined with the demonstrated 
willingness of Russia to expand the conflict, deterred further NATO advances.47  Apart 
from the significance of such exercises in indicating increased Russian security concerns 
vis-à-vis NATO and the United States, the exercise also indicated a greater reliance on 
nuclear weapons in Russian military thought. 
The reemergence of MD as a major objective of U.S. policy in January 1999, 
therefore, may have seemed particularly alarming to Russian leaders, given the 
foundation of strategic insecurity and distrust of U.S. intentions that had developed over 
the past decade.  John D. Holum, Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International 
Security during the Clinton Administration, acknowledged this point in a March 2000 
address at Stanford University:   
We [Americans] tend not to understand that countries—Russia and China, 
in particular—tend to look at NMD in a larger context; they connect the 
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dots.  Thus, it’s not totally surprising that the Russians see a more 
threatening environment when they link, for example, NMD with NATO 
expansion; intervention in Kosovo without United Nations imprimatur; 
and a general decline in the Russian military power.48   
These various issues are probably linked in the minds of Russian leaders, and jointly 
create a foundation for Russian perceptions of U.S. aggressive intent regarding MD.   
How might the current MD debate be exacerbating Russian perceptions of a U.S. 
threat?  The pattern of U.S.-Russian MD discourse has gone through complex twists and 
turns since January 1999—from diplomatic confrontation to stalemate and more recent 
glimmerings of potential compromise.  However, a few recurring themes stand out that 
are strongly reminiscent of the language of the spiral model.  The first issue relates to 
perceptions of U.S. intentions.  The Bush Administration has stated: 
The principal threat today is no longer a disarming first-strike like we 
thought about in the Cold War, but rather the use of long-range missiles by 
rogue states for the purposes of terror, coercion and aggression...we have 
said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat of 
blackmail and terror by rogue states.49   
Yet, the majority of Russian declarations have indicated a basic disagreement 
with the American threat assessment.  In discussing President Putin’s July 2000 
diplomatic visit to Pyongyang, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov firmly rejected U.S. 
claims that the threat of “rogue states” was sufficient to warrant construction of a U.S. 
MD.  Referring to North Korea, he said, “We proceed from the view that currently there 
is no threat.”50  Exploitation of the arguments advanced by prominent Americans has 
become common in this regard.  Vladimir Orlov of the PIR center (an independent 
Russian think-tank) has cited former Senator Sam Nunn and others as saying that the 
direct threat to U.S. security is clearly the danger of Russian missiles and not that of 
“rogue states.” Furthermore, Orlov has declared, it is “practically impossible for North 
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Korea to launch missiles against the United States because the survival of the regime is 
the most important thing for North Korea.”51 
Related to this issue of U.S. intent are Russian assertions that the United States 
has ignored Russian security concerns and is determined to act unilaterally.  This is 
perhaps the subtlest perceptual issue, but it may play a significant role in driving Russian 
fears of U.S. hegemonic behavior.  One example of these views may be seen in Russian 
news coverage of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s actions at the February 2001 
European defense conference in Munich.  Secretary Rumsfeld declared that: 
the United States intends to develop and deploy a missile defense designed 
to defend our people and forces against a limited ballistic missile 
attack...These systems will be a threat to no one.  They should be of 
concern to no one, save those who would threaten others.52   
Secretary Rumsfeld immediately left the forum after his comments without waiting to 
hear the views of the Russian delegation. Such behavior encouraged a Russian view that 
“the White House will not care about Russia’s position.”53  When Russians perceive the 
United States as acting unilaterally, their belief in U.S. hegemonism is reinforced and 
their negotiating stance likely hardens against compromise. 
Because the Russians have generally not viewed the threat in the same light as 
U.S. leaders, there has been a tendency for Russian (and Chinese) elites to conclude that 
the “true” objectives behind U.S. MD must be more expansive.  Pavel Felgenhauer, a 
military analyst in Moscow, stated, “There is no military threat [referring to “rogue 
states”] so Russian Generals are suspicious...They are asking: ‘Why is the U.S. spending 
so much money on this?  They must be up to some kind of mischief, like a decision to 
undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.”54  This first theme describes one perceptual 
                                                 
51“Press Conference with Vladimir Orlov, Yuri Fyodorov and Dmitry Yevstafyev, PIR Center 
Officials, on RF-US Agenda,” Federal News Service, Inc., official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 
14 June 2001.  
52 Donald H. Rumsfeld, remarks, Munich Conference on European Security Policy, 3 February 2001, 
U.S. Department of Defense Homepage, 4 August 2001 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010203-secdef.html>. 
53 Andrei Piontkovsky and Vitaly Tsigichko, “Tango with Russia,” Defense and Security, 16 February 
2001. 
54 Felgenhauer quoted in Scott Peterson, “Moscow’s Offense Against US Missile Defense,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, 14 March 2001. 
31 
element of the spiral model—that is, perceptions of aggressive intent.  In this context 
Russian leaders may believe that U.S. MD is aimed at degrading their capabilities.  As 
discussed above, this perception may be bolstered by the preexisting image Russian 
leaders have developed of U.S. actions over the last decade, notably with regard to 
NATO.    
A second theme relates to the threat of MD to U.S.-Russian strategic stability.  
There has been extensive debate over the impact of MD on Russia’s nuclear capabilities.  
U.S. assessments generally tend to discount the possibility that any type of MD system 
could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future, whereas Russian 
assessments have tended to be far more alarmist.  Several Russian analysts, for instance, 
have suggested that the combination of NATO enlargement, U.S. dominance in 
submarine warfare, and U.S. MD will make Russia vulnerable to a U.S. nuclear first-
strike.55 
U.S. and Russian leaders have disagreed regarding the potential impact of U.S. 
MD on international stability in general.  President Bush has stated, “We need new 
concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces...Defenses can 
strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.”56  In contrast, Russian 
leaders have repeatedly asserted that U.S. MD will destabilize the international 
environment and promote arms competition and proliferation.  A joint Sino-Russian 
communiqué submitted in the UN Conference on Disarmament stated: 
The two sides consider that the undermining or violation of the ABM 
Treaty would lead to a series of negative consequences: the emergence of 
new factors which could destabilize the international situation both at the 
global and the regional level, and of conditions for the resumption of an 
arms race and for the creation of additional obstacles to the process of 
disarmament.57  
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Such perceptions that MD will decrease Russian security form a second critical element 
of spiral model behavior.  That is, one state’s actions to increase its own security are 
perceived by other states as decreasing their security.  
A third theme relates to simple lack of clarity in U.S. and Russian policies on 
MD.  Both U.S. and Russian leaders have consistently claimed that the other side’s 
position is unclear.  For example, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told reporters in 
July 2001 that he was unable to “say anything definite” about where things stood between 
the United States and Russia on MD.  “Some [American leaders] say they are 
withdrawing from the treaty.  Others say they are not withdrawing...there is no point in 
reacting to such very contradictory statements.”58  U.S. leaders have observed a similar 
lack of clarity on Russia’s part as well.  One unnamed Clinton Administration official 
told the New York Times in June 2000, “Putin says ‘yes’ when he means ‘no’.  He says I 
agree with you and then elaborates.  And after you examine this elaboration you discover 
there is almost no agreement there.”59   
This apparent lack of effective communication in the United States-Russian MD 
discourse could have two potential effects.  First, it could significantly hinder the 
consultation process.  More importantly, it could foster confusion and distrust.  This latter 
factor could increase the potential for perceptual distortions of the other side’s actions 
and intentions.  These observations should be qualified, however, in view of the fact that 
public statements inevitably have a “public diplomacy” dimension and do not, by 
definition, reveal classified assessments. 
A final aspect of the Russian opposition to MD has been a Russian tendency to 
employ threats of escalated “arms race” activity.  In July 2000, for example, General 
Vladimir Yakovlev (then the Commander, Russian Strategic Rocket Forces) declared that 
Russia would respond to U.S. MD by abandoning the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty—thus allowing deployment of missiles designed to hold U.S. allies in 
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Europe and Asia hostage as a deterrent against U.S. aims.60  A less direct example may 
include President Putin’s announcement in March 2001 that Russia had agreed to resume 
arms and technology sales to Iran. This announcement may help to fuel MD opponents’ 
concerns that U.S. MD will encourage greater arms proliferation.61  The nature of 
Russian threats may be intentionally aimed at playing to the worst fears of MD opponents 
in Western societies.  However, they may also be sincere indicators of the degree to 
which Russians see U.S. MD as threatening.  The public expression of strong views 
suggests an increased likelihood for misunderstandings, heightened feelings of threat and 
distorted perceptions of the other’s intentions. 
Several elements of the current U.S.-Russian MD debate are suggestive of the 
dynamics of the spiral model.  The growing tension between Russian leaders’ desires to 
counter U.S. MD activities and their increasing inability to do so may have established 
conditions for Russian leaders to see MD as a threat to their national security.  The 
language of the debate supports the notion that Russians believe U.S. MD is aimed at 
eroding their security, and that the United States seeks goals with MD beyond addressing 
the “rogue state” threat. 
However, considerations beyond perceptions of aggressive intent are also playing 
a significant role in Russian opposition to U.S. MD.  A recent flurry of U.S.-Russian 
diplomatic exchanges has appeared to open the door for compromise on MD.  The 
breakthrough appeared to occur during discussions at the G8 conference in Genoa, Italy, 
in which Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that any U.S. MD would be linked with talks 
on offensive nuclear arms cuts.  President Putin stated: 
As far as the ABM Treaty and the issues of offensive arms...we’ve [Bush 
and Putin] come to the conclusion that the two of these issues have to be 
discussed as a set...Neither one, nor the other side should feel it is 
somehow threatened or constrained...we have to maintain a balance.62 
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Shortly after the conference President Putin seemed to suggest for the first time that 
compromise over ABM Treaty modification might be acceptable.63   
The significance of “balance” as a determining factor in Russia’s willingness to 
compromise on MD needs to be investigated further to better assess possible incentives 
fueling Russian opposition to U.S. MD.  The strong link between offensive and defensive 
systems in the current rapprochement suggests that Russia may be concerned with the 
sustainability of its nuclear deterrent.  In this context, the thesis now turns to an 
assessment of the potential impact of MD on U.S.-Russian crisis stability. 
2.  Crisis Stability 
A recurring theme of Russian leaders’ arguments against U.S. MD, as previously 
discussed, has been that MD poses a threat to U.S.-Russian strategic stability.  The key 
Russian concern in this context has been that U.S. MD might degrade Russia’s nuclear 
deterrent against the United States.  From the Russian perspective such an eventuality 
might allow the United States greater freedom of maneuver in pursuing policies opposed 
to Russian security interests.  In the worst case, applying Cold War thinking, the Russians 
might imagine that the shift in the offense-defense balance could generate U.S. first-strike 
incentives, as discussed in Chapter II.  To the extent that U.S. MD is perceived as 
negating the Russian deterrent, strong Russian incentives to engage in “arms race” 
activity could be created as U.S. MD is deployed. 
The obvious question, of course, is what the impact of U.S. MD on the Russian 
nuclear deterrent might be.  The issue is not amenable to a straightforward answer for 
several reasons.  First, the extent—in terms of numbers and types of interceptors—of the 
Bush Administration’s plan for MD deployment is not a matter of public record, and has 
probably not been entirely formulated yet.  As described in the Introduction, a range of 
MD options (i.e., threshold “capability 1”, expanded “capability 1” and “capability 3”) 
are herein considered to provide a basis for analysis.64   
Second, there is wide disagreement over MD’s technical feasibility.  This is 
mainly because the systems in question are still in development.  Estimating, for 
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example, the probable kill ratio of MD interceptors to Russian missiles is difficult.  
Statements made by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Jacques 
Gansler in June 2000 suggest that the Ballistic Missile Defense Office then planned to 
allocate more than one interceptor per incoming ballistic missile warhead in order to 
achieve an acceptable probability of target destruction.65  If one grants each interceptor 
an 80 percent chance of destroying the target—an optimistic value given the MD test 
program results thus far—then four shots per inbound missile would be necessary to 
ensure a kill probability approaching 100 percent.   
This four to one formulation does not take into account many complicating 
variables—countermeasures, for example—that would affect the basic assumption of 80 
percent interceptor hit probability.  Despite the risk of oversimplification, however, this 
four to one formulation should suffice in demonstrating the likely worst-case 
effectiveness (from a Russian perspective) of U.S. MD against Russian missiles.  
Lastly, the state of Russian strategic forces is a matter of significant debate.  
Severe economic constraints and aging are driving the numbers and operational readiness 
of Russia’s strategic forces down.  Total START-accountable Russian warheads 
deployed on strategic forces—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-launched bombs/missiles—in June 2001 
were estimated at 5,600.66  Depending on the operational status of Russia’s nuclear forces 
and early-warning networks, Congressional Budget Office analysts have forecast that a 
massive U.S. surprise first-strike could reduce Russian strategic forces available for a 
retaliatory strike to between 8 and 42 percent.67  Utilizing the remarkably extreme 
assumptions of the lower end survivability of 8 percent, however, even a C3 MD system 
could pose little threat to Russia’s deterrent today.  In that instance, over 380 ICBM 
warheads would be able to penetrate U.S. MD to strike U.S. targets.  Clearly, this would 
be sufficient to produce unacceptable damage to U.S. society.  As a metric of the damage 
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such a force might inflict, some weapon-effects studies have concluded that detonating as 
“few” as 200 warheads over key U.S. economic targets would be sufficient to induce 
“mass starvation and economic collapse.”68 
At issue, however, is the impact of U.S. MD on stability over time as Russia’s 
nuclear arsenal diminishes.  Most Russian and U.S. analysts concur that for economic 
reasons Russia’s nuclear forces will significantly decline in the near term.  Some extreme 
estimates predict levels as low as 500 warheads by 2010.69  The consensus, however, 
appears to expect between 1,000 and 1,500 warheads by 2010.  The Monterey Institute of 
International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001 Nuclear 
Status Report provides detailed forecasts of Russian nuclear force levels for 2007 (the 
START II completion date) and 2010.  The forecasts are based upon a wide range of data 
from various government and non-government sources that take into account Russian 
force obsolescence and acquisition planning.70  Under START II provisions, this source 
estimates that Russia will have 1,678 operational warheads in 2007 and 1,086 operational 
warheads in 2010.71  Utilizing this trend data in conjunction with the assumptions 
outlined above regarding MD effectiveness and hypothetical U.S. first-strike results, 
some basic calculations can be made to estimate the impact of various levels of U.S. MD 
on the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent.   
The threshold C1 MD deployment is assessed to be highly unlikely to negate 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent.  In the worst case, Russian forces available to retaliate 
following a U.S. nuclear attack in 2010 would be 87 warheads.  Of this amount, 
approximately 82 warheads would penetrate U.S. defenses.     
The Clinton Administration’s expanded C1 MD system would have a similar 
impact on Russian capabilities as the threshold C1 system in 2010, allowing slightly                                                  
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fewer than 70 warheads to reach U.S. soil during a Russian counterattack.  At C3 MD 
deployment levels, however, the potential impact on Russian deterrent capabilities 
becomes more significant.  In that case, Russia could be left with a penetration capability 
of some 24 warheads in 2010.  It should be noted, however, that this level would still be 
comparable to the level of strategic deterrent considered acceptable by nations such as 
China.  The results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Warheads Penetrating U.S. MD in a Russian Counterstrike as a Function of 
Russian Arsenal Size and Number of U.S. MD Interceptors 
 
Intuitively, even 24 warheads penetrating to strike U.S. soil seems more than 
sufficient to deter hypothetical U.S. aggression in times of crisis.  However, there are 
potentially complicating issues to consider.  As suggested in Chapter II, perceptual 
distortions and uncertainty may lead Russian leaders to exaggerate the expected effects of 
U.S. MD on crisis stability.  There also may be a fear that once a baseline system is in 
place, the ability of U.S. leaders to expand MD capabilities will be significantly 
enhanced.  In other words, the initial threshold C1, expanded C1 or C3 capabilities might 
provide the necessary “stepping stone” to a far more advanced and effective system.  This 
notion of a U.S. “breakout” potential has been reflected in the declarations of several 
Russian leaders in the past.  Moreover, U.S. planners have on occasion acknowledged the 
significant doubt that U.S. MD might create in the minds of Russian leaders.  For 
example, a 1995 analysis prepared for Congress by the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile 







Threshold C1 (20 I) 443 130 82 
Expanded C1 (100 I) 423 110 62 
C3 (250 I) 385 72 24 
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Defense Office stated that MD “could augment deterrence by significantly increasing the 
Russian planners’ doubts that any military attack on the United States could succeed.”72  
Considering the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff’s May 2000 assessment that 2,000 
U.S. warheads were required to meet U.S. security needs,73 it is reasonable to assert 
Russian leaders would look at its own retaliatory capability falling below 100 with great 
concern. 
Lastly, if Russian force levels do drop below 1,000 by 2010 as some analysts have 
projected (e.g., the previously mentioned 500 warhead estimate), even the very limited 
threshold C1 capability could have a major impact on the Russian capacity to respond to 
a U.S. attack.  Estimates of Russian warheads reaching U.S. soil in that case would be 35, 
15 and zero against the United States threshold C1, expanded C1 and C3 systems 
respectively.  Under such conditions, the Russian strategic deterrent would clearly be in 
jeopardy. 
In any discussion of such extreme hypothetical situations, it should be 
underscored that actual nuclear exchanges (a) would probably not conform to theoretical 
models, owing to reliability shortfalls and Clausewitzian “friction” factors, among other 
considerations; and (b) would involve massive fallout and other environmental damage 
deterring both Moscow and Washington from contemplating such actions.   
At least for the coming decade this assessment suggests that it is unlikely that 
U.S. MD will negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent, although under certain conditions there 
could be a significant impact.  Furthermore, Russian leaders have begun to acknowledge 
this conclusion in their own public declarations, and have offered judgments extending 
well beyond the next decade.  For example, President Putin announced to reporters in 
Slovenia in June 2001 that he believed that if U.S. MD were deployed, it “would not 
effectively counter Russia’s huge nuclear arsenal for at least 25 years.”74  If such 
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statements about MD, which incidentally represent a major reversal from previous 
Russian declarations, express sincere Russian assessments of U.S. MD’s potential threat 
to strategic stability, crisis stability concerns are evidently not the sole driver of Russian 
opposition to U.S. MD plans. 
Ultimately, crisis stability (defined narrowly, as simply a function of force posture 
characteristics) depends upon the judgments each side makes about the other’s 
capabilities, and the assumptions underlying those judgments.  For example, in Table 1 
several worst-case conditions were considered to estimate the potential extent of U.S. 
MD’s effect on Russia’s deterrent.  As this analysis suggests, in certain circumstances 
there could be a basis for Russian leaders’ concerns.  The opposing trends of decreasing 
Russian offensive capability and increasing U.S. MD capability could move the United 
States-Russian balance in the direction of instability at some point in the future unless: (a) 
U.S. offensive force levels were reduced in conjunction with defensive system 
deployments, or (b) Russian leaders countered U.S. MD deployments through defensive 
or offensive arms competition.   
President Putin’s positive reaction to President Bush’s agreement in July 2001 to 
link offensive arms reduction talks with MD consultations, as previously noted, may in 
part reflect Russian desires to hedge against the possible continuation of this long-term 
trend towards crisis instability.  Furthermore, insofar as Russia is able to encourage the 
United States to continue its movement towards lower numbers of offensive weapons, the 
uncertainties regarding MD’s impact on the United States-Russian balance will be 
reduced, as will be the resources Russia requires to maintain the strategic balance. 
3.  Prestige 
Much of Russia’s approach to national defense has been inherited from the Soviet 
Union.  There are three key factors of significance in this regard.  First, in a country 
historically beset by economic hardship and social strife, military-industrial productivity 
and strong defense capabilities became key foundations of regime legitimacy.  Martin 
Malia has argued that Soviet military performance in World War II “gave the regime [the 
Communist Party] an additional forty-five years of life, something its virtues as a system 
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alone probably would not have afforded it.”75  Military strength played a fundamental 
role in allowing the Soviet Union to occupy a position of political equality with the 
United States during the Cold War.  It is likely that Russia’s nuclear arsenal yet provides 
it a place at the international bargaining table out of proportion to its economic standing.  
The simple fact that the United States is exerting considerable effort to compromise with 
Russia over U.S. MD supports this judgment. 
Second, the Soviet system was designed for war production.  During the 1980s, 
for example, approximately 60 percent of machine building was devoted to the military-
industrial complex.76  In the post-Cold War era, the process of “demilitarizing” the 
Russian economy has been a slow and painful one.77  The military-industrial complex, 
and in particular the Strategic Rocket Forces, still exert powerful influence over Russian 
decision-making.  This probably explains why in the midst of a severe financial crisis, 
Russian leaders continue to devote scarce resources to nuclear modernization programs, 
research on “third-generation” nuclear weapons, and investments such as the ongoing 
effort to build large networks of underground tunnels and command and control facilities 
in the Ural Mountains (designed for over 60,000 occupants) for the purpose of shielding 
elites in the unlikely event of nuclear war.78   
Third, many of the political and military elites that were in power during the 
Soviet era are still in positions of power today.  Even though the political system has 
changed dramatically since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these elites likely retain 
many of the attitudes and practices they acquired under that regime with regard to 
strategic planning and the role of military power.  Insofar as these leaders pursue old 
methods and yearn for the dominant political and military stature of Russia’s recent past, 
Russia’s present decline must be distressing.  In short, the institutions, practices and 
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experiences carried over from the Soviet era undoubtedly help shape current Russian 
thought. 
Today, the focus on military might in defining Russia’s superpower status has 
likely become even greater.  Russia’s economic decline over the last decade has 
dramatically reduced its standing in the international market.  The extent and pace of this 
decline may be partially revealed through three metrics.  First, between 1992 and 1999 
Russian GDP dropped more than 44 percent (a greater decrease than that of the American 
Great Depression).79  Second, over the last decade Russia’s economic standing in the 
world went from second to well below tenth, with states such as Indonesia, Brazil and 
Mexico ahead in GDP.  Lastly, and perhaps most telling, domestic scarcity and social ills 
have caused male life expectancy in Russia to fall below that in many Third World 
countries (from 70 years in 1989 to below 58 years by 1994).80  By most economic 
measures, Russia has become a secondary world power.  
This economic decline has resulted in sweeping reductions of Russia’s military 
forces.  Having inherited over 85 percent of the Soviet Union’s military potential (i.e., 
equipment, infrastructure and manpower) with less than 60 percent of its GDP, Russia 
possesses an enormous force structure it can ill afford.81  Consequently, virtually every 
branch of the military establishment has suffered severe cutbacks and budget shortfalls.  
Events such as NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict in March-June 1999 
(and the Kursk disaster in August 2000) have helped to exacerbate Russian awareness of 
growing vulnerability.  It was likely in an effort to compensate for this reduction in 
conventional military strength that Russian policy was changed after Kosovo to reflect an 
increased emphasis on nuclear weapons (i.e., because nuclear weapons are seen as more 
cost-effective than conventional forces).  The primary change, reflected in the 2000 
Russian National Security Concept (NSC), has been to expand the conditions for nuclear 
weapons use from repelling an armed aggression “[that] creates a threat to the very 
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existence of the Russian Federation” to “if all other measures of resolving the crisis have 
been exhausted or proven ineffective.”82    
The 2000 NSC also reveals potentially important insights into Russia’s view of its 
changing strategic environment related to concerns over its diminishing international 
standing.  For example, the NSC cites “the danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, 
economic and military influence in the world” as one of the fundamental threats to 
stability in the international sphere.  The document also partially attributes Russia’s 
weakening state to the efforts (as perceived by Russians) of other nations to further the 
country’s decline: 
A number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, 
economically, militarily and in other ways.  Attempts to ignore Russia’s 
interest when solving major issues of international relations...are capable 
of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes 
achieved in international relations...Threats to the Russian Federation’s 
national security in the international sphere can be seen as attempts by 
other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the centres of a 
multi-polar world.83 
The message that Russia sees itself as being ignored and diminished by other 
powers is certainly telling, and suggests how deep Russian concerns over loss of prestige 
may be.  The thinly veiled references to America as the main foil in this regard are 
unmistakable.  This same message has been repeatedly asserted in the context of U.S.-
Russian relations.  A striking illustration is Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s December 
1999 statement regarding U.S. criticism of Russia’s actions in Chechnya:  “It seems Mr. 
Clinton has forgotten Russia is a great power that possesses a nuclear arsenal.  We aren’t 
afraid at all of Clinton’s anti-Russian plans.”84  More recently, Alexei Pushkov, a 
member of Russia’s Presidential Foreign Policy Council, stated with regard to U.S. MD 
plans, “It is unwise for the United States to think that Russia is a weak country 
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today...Russia can still use the fact that it has a very important nuclear potential as a 
bargaining factor.”85 
This theme of continuing Russian greatness through military power, with its 
origins in Russia’s imperial past, can be seen today in the bellicosity of the Russian 
people.  One measure of this tendency may be the surprisingly positive reaction of the 
Russian population to the second post-Soviet Chechen War, which began in late 1999.  
Many analysts judge that it was then-Prime Minister Putin’s active role in supporting 
Russian forces in the Chechen War (in terms of pushing for resources and military 
freedom of action) that propelled him to Russia’s leading position.  His popularity rating 
has skyrocketed, in large part because of the war, from near zero to 58 percent in but a 
few years.86     
Interpreting this reaction to a conflict that is arguably (from a non-Russian view) 
further destroying the rule of law and morale in an already devastated military 
establishment is difficult.  Anatol Lieven, a research fellow at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, has argued that there has been a distinctive lack of Russian 
nationalism in the 1990s, despite Western views to the contrary, due to an absence of 
institutions for mass mobilization and a history in which ethnic nationalism was 
suppressed by ideology.87  If such an assessment is correct, then the strong support of the 
Russian people for military operations in Chechnya may reflect the emergence of a new 
nationalism.  President Putin, however, has expressed an alternative explanation: 
I had already decided that my career might be over, but that my mission, 
my historical mission—and this will sound lofty, but its true—consisted of 
resolving the situation in the Northern Caucasus...That is what I thought of 
the situation in August [1999]...I was convinced that if we didn’t stop the 
extremists right away, we’d be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire 
territory of the Russian Federation—the Yugoslavization of Russia...I 
have never for a second believed...that Chechnya would limit itself to its 
own independence.  It would be a beachhead for further attacks on 
Russia...The entire Caucasus would have followed—Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
                                                 
85Pushkov quoted in Scott Peterson, “Moscow’s Offense Against US Missile Defense,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, 14 March 2001. 
86 Ben Aris, “Military Finds Strength in Chechnya War,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 24 November 
1999. 
87 Anatol Lieven, “The Weakness of Russian Nationalism,” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999) 
53-55. 
44 
and then up along the Volga River to Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, 
reaching deep into the county...[T]he disintegration of such an enormous 
country would have been a global catastrophe.88  
In this view, then, Russian support for the war stems from powerful convictions about the 
implications of losing sovereignty over Chechnya. 
Regardless of the origins of Russian bellicosity, it appears that many Russians see 
the forceful reassertion of Moscow’s rule in Chechnya as a reaffirmation of Russian 
strength—a strength that cannot be demonstrated today in non-military spheres.  When 
discussing the Chechen campaign with reporters in Moscow in February 2000, the 
Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, talked tough about 
Russia regaining its international stature.  He stated that, “Under Mr. Putin Russia is 
reversing the trend of having lost its voice” and has shown that “we still know how to 
bite.”89   
Ivanov’s attitude is clearly shared by a large number of Russian citizens.  A 
Russian public opinion survey conducted in 2000 showed that 49 percent of respondents 
agreed with the statement that “Russia must keep a big and powerful army, even if it does 
not have sufficient resources for that.”90  This is a particularly significant finding in a 
nation where in 1999 over 34 percent of the population lived below the poverty level.91  
To the extent that Russians yet equate regime strength and prestige with military strength, 
the implications for the MD debate may be severe.   
Given the likelihood that Russia’s sense of prestige is strongly related to its 
military and security status, it is apparent that under current conditions U.S. MD 
potentially strikes at the heart of Russian pride.  As important measures of Russian 
international status have deteriorated (e.g., the economy and diplomatic influence), 
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military strength has grown in relative importance.  The focus of military strength has 
turned for fiscal reasons towards higher reliance on nuclear forces until economic 
recovery can be accomplished sufficiently to rebuild Russian conventional strength.  This 
trend has been occurring at the same time that Russia is experiencing significant 
difficulty maintaining its existing nuclear arsenal.  Because U.S. MD could in some 
circumstances further diminish this particular measure of Russian power, U.S. MD could 
directly threaten Russia’s standing as a superpower and present a significant challenge to 
Russia’s prestige. 
With this general trend towards higher reliance on nuclear forces, a debate over 
priorities has been underway in the Russian military since 1997.  The Chief of the 
General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, has argued for major cutbacks in Russia’s 
strategic nuclear forces to allow for conventional force modernization and continued 
reliance upon non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF).  Another camp, led by Marshal Igor 
Sergeyev, a former Defense Minister and current adviser to President Putin, has argued 
that the focus must be on strategic nuclear forces.92  This debate, as yet unconcluded, 
may have implications for potential Russian reactions to a U.S. MD deployment.  For 
example, the existence of strong military constituencies desirous of strategic force 
reductions may:  (a) increase pressure on Russian politicians to reach a compromise with 
the United States over MD; and (b) decrease the likelihood of a Russian strategic arms 
build-up following U.S. MD deployment.   
The recent indications of impending compromise between Presidents Bush and 
Putin over MD may be a further reflection of the importance of prestige in the current 
debate.  Several analysts have suggested that, regardless of whether an agreement is 
reached, simply by meeting with President Putin as an equal President Bush has helped to 
restore Russia’s sense that it remains a major power in the world, despite its economic 
hardships, its loss of territory and its declining international influence.93 
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In addition to concerns over U.S. intentions and strategic stability, Russian 
prestige should be considered as a potential driver of arms competition following a U.S. 
MD deployment.  Indeed, prestige concerns may in actuality be the key incentive driving 
Russian reactions because of the strong psychological and emotional connection between 
military strength and Russian identity.  It is difficult to separate prestige from the other 
incentives considered thus far, however. For instance, it is likely that concerns over 
prestige help fuel perceptual distortions in Russia—e.g., that the United States has 
aggressive intentions and constitutes a threat.  If the relevance of these three interrelated 
incentives is granted, the focus must turn to Russia’s realistic capabilities for arms 
competition given its current state of economic and military decline. 
B.  ARMS RACE CAPABILITIES 
The official Russian position has been that should the United States choose to 
unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia would withdraw from other 
arms control treaties (e.g., START, INF and CFE). Additionally, Russian leaders have 
explicitly suggested a wide range of alternative force posture responses to counter U.S. 
MD.  Examples include the retention of MIRVed SS-18 missiles, maintaining a launch on 
warning posture, the development of MD countermeasures, and the MIRVing of SS-27 
ICBMs.94  Other potential responses implied by the diplomatic actions of Russian leaders 
have included arms and technology transfers to other nations (in effect, promoting WMD 
proliferation) and the formation of anti-American alliances with other states (e.g., China).  
Regardless of Russian leaders’ preferences over U.S. MD, however, Russia faces 
numerous practical constraints on its range of possible responses.  Most of these 
constraints relate directly to the aforementioned economic hardships. 
1.  Economic Potential 
Russia’s financial predicament is profound and unlikely to change fundamentally 
in the near term for several reasons.  Although the Russian economy has experienced 
occasional modest upswings due to the fluctuating world oil market (e.g., in 1997 and 
1999), the basic problems underlying the Russian economic system have not been 
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corrected.  In other words, true economic reform has yet to occur in the post-Cold War 
years.   
Three issues loom large in this regard.  First, Russia’s economic structure is still 
heavily militarized.  For more than half a century the best materials, human resources and 
technologies went into defense-related industries.  The defense-industrial base was the 
core of the Soviet economy.  Today, the civilian economy is still merely an adjunct to the 
defense industry, which is itself an extremely inefficient and increasingly non-productive 
apparatus.95  Past efforts to bolster the waning defense industry through arms exports 
have not produced the anticipated returns.  This is in large part due to an overall decrease 
in the world arms demand, compounded by Russia’s loss of a substantial portion of the 
East European arms market in the mid-1990s.  Recent arms sales to China may alter this 
picture slightly, but on balance are unlikely to reverse the economic decline to any 
significant degree.96  In any case, such sales only provide temporary windfalls (as do 
occasional rises in oil prices), and they do not provide a sustainable solution for Russia’s 
economic problems.   
Second, although the Soviet state was always corrupt, organized crime has been 
pervasive in post-Cold War Russia.  For instance, some economists have estimated that 
between 22 and 50 percent of Russian GDP in the late 1990s was tied to the black 
market.97   The lack of effective market regulations and the poor rule of law have resulted 
in the creation of a complex web of criminal alliances, clans and fiefdoms with a stake in 
discouraging reforms.  This corruption heavily penetrates the defense sector.  One two-
year study of the Russian defense industry conducted by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies concluded that, “Left unchecked Russia is in danger of becoming a 
‘criminal-syndicalist state’ under the control of corrupt government bureaucrats, 
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politicians, businessmen, and criminals.”98  This high level of corruption not only makes 
true market reforms unlikely, but it also makes a coherent plan of any kind (e.g., defense 
buildup) difficult to pursue. 
Lastly, many of the economic gains the Russian economy has enjoyed (e.g., the 
recent resurgence in oil prices) are being lost to capital flight.  Much of this reflects the 
magnitude of corruption and organized crime in Russia.  Disproportionate amounts of the 
nation’s resource profits fall into the hands of a few privileged elites—the so-called 
“oligarchs.”  As with other nations heavily reliant on revenue from raw material exports 
(e.g., Venezuela), the economic elites are investing their profits abroad rather than in the 
less favorable domestic arena.  In other words, the profits are not being utilized to 
improve Russian security and the country’s domestic condition.  The rate of such capital 
exports was a staggering U.S. $1 billion a month in 1999.99 
The overall consequence of these various factors has been a severely weakened 
Russian economy with limited near-term prospects for a solid and enduring revival.  
According to the 1999 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum in 
Switzerland, in an assessment of eight criteria of economic potential—i.e., openness to 
trade and investment, the role of the state, finance, infrastructure, technology, 
management, labor and institutions—Russia ranked last of the 59 nations examined.100  
William Odom summed up the state of Russian economic affairs in 1998 as follows: 
Russia is afflicted with the post-colonial weak state syndrome so common 
throughout the Third World.  This predicament is neither abnormal nor 
likely to be temporary; it can endure for decades...Russian economic 
prosperity...is highly improbable in the next decade or two...Certain 
institutions of government are imperative for effective economic 
performance...Russia neither has them nor shows any likelihood of 
creating them soon.101 
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2.  Strategic Potential 
Russia’s potential to engage in arms competition with the United States seems 
low indeed, given the lack of a viable economic foundation to support such an objective.  
In the general military situation, several indicators bode poorly for any prospects of major 
buildups in conventional or strategic nuclear forces.  To begin with, the government is 
not able to adequately compensate its service members in pay or benefits.  In 1999, 
according to a Russian government study, 49.9 percent of Russian servicemen’s families 
earned incomes below the subsistence level, as compared with 33 percent in the general 
population.102  Furthermore, according to Russian Labor Minister Alexander Pochinok, 
some 164,000 military retirees are waiting an average of 15 to 18 years for basic 
retirement housing benefits.103 
Financial hardships extend to new military equipment acquisition and the 
maintenance of legacy operational systems as well.  At the end of the Soviet era, 
expenditures for new armaments, scientific research, and experimental design constituted 
approximately two-thirds of the defense budget.  In 2001 some Russian budget experts 
assess that between 70 and 82 percent of the defense budget goes into simply maintaining 
(without upgrades) the existing force.104  Speaking of the Russian defense budget for 
2001, Duma Defense Committee Chairman General Andrei Nikolaev told Russian news 
agencies that: 
The purchases of arms for the general purpose forces will have a 
piecemeal character.  The armed forces won’t receive even a single 
aircraft, or a helicopter, or an anti-aircraft missile complex, not a single 
tank or an infantry combat vehicle...in 2001 the Russian Army won’t get a 
single piece of new modern equipment.105 
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Furthermore, the mid-term plan for reforming the military—The Plan for Building 
the Armed Forces in 2001-2010—suggests that during the period of 2001-2008 
expenditures will mainly be restricted to “repairs and step by step modernization of the 
existing equipment.”106   In other words, at least in the near-term, there is no money for 
new acquisitions. 
The picture for the strategic nuclear forces is much the same.  Two major 
difficulties constrain the prospects for Russian leaders to pursue nuclear arms buildups in 
response to U.S. MD.  First, the ongoing financial crisis has had a severe impact on the 
acquisition of new weapon systems.  The only new strategic missile purchases since 1992 
have been the SS-27 TOPOL-M ICBMs and the SS-N-23 SKIFF SLBMs. This 
significant reduction from the tremendous range of systems the Soviet Union possessed is 
not in itself a sign of weakening.  In actuality, the earlier large variety of missiles was 
quite inefficient economically.  However, the pace of development of these systems has 
been slow and hindered by budget shortfalls.  For instance, the original planned 
production rate for SS-27 TOPOL-M ICBMs beginning in 1998 was thirty to forty 
missiles per year.  The actual production rates, though, have been fewer than ten missiles 
annually.107 
The second difficulty is that the existing nuclear arsenal is rapidly approaching 
obsolescence.  For example, the last SS-18 SATAN ICBM modification took place in the 
1979-1983 period, with some new missiles deployed as late as 1991.  Under START II 
terms, all SS-18s must be dismantled by 2007 (because of an ICBM MIRVing prohibition 
in the treaty).  But even without START II restrictions, given a maximum service life 
extension of up to 18 years, few if any SS-18s will remain by 2010.108      
In the other legs of Russia’s strategic triad (i.e., the submarine and bomber 
delivery systems) the story is similar.  Not a single new SSBN (ballistic missile 
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submarine) has been commissioned since 1992, and most of the ships in the active fleet 
(apart from some Delta III and Delta IV SSBNs) will reach the end of their service lives 
by 2007. New submarine construction (e.g., the Project 955/Borey Class SSBN) has 
ground to a halt, and it is unlikely that more than three could be produced by 2010.109  In 
air power, only one TU-160 heavy bomber has been built since 1993.  But here the 
situation is not quite as grave as with the ICBM and SLBM legs of the triad, given 
service lives that will carry much of the active bomber fleet to the 2010-2015 
timeframe.110 
In sum, Russia’s strategic potential to respond to a U.S. MD deployment through 
a vertical arms buildup is severely limited by both economic constraints and the service 
life limitations of the existing inventory.  A consensus amongst Russian and U.S. analysts 
holds that regardless of what the United States does in terms of MD, and irrespective of 
whatever economic and military policies Russian leaders pursue in the near-term, in all 
likelihood the Russian strategic forces will decrease to between 1,000 and 1,500 START-
accountable warheads by 2010.  Russia therefore requires further arms reduction 
agreements (i.e., START II and START III) far more than the United States does.111 
3.  Options 
Despite the severe constraints on Russia’s ability to engage in arms competition, 
Russian leaders have a range of options available to them, short of an offensive weapons 
buildup, which could complicate U.S. decision-making and pose a threat to U.S. national 
security.  Three key areas will be examined—direct military posture options, proliferation 
and diplomatic options. 
In terms of direct military posture options Russian leaders might be able to take 
three steps.  First, Russia could retain some of its aging ICBMs past the START II 
elimination date of 2007.  For example, a few SS-18s, SS-19s and SS-25s could 
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theoretically be maintained until 2010, although most of these weapons’ service lives will 
expire by that time.   
The potential for START II’s entry into force is uncertain regardless of the path 
the United States takes for MD.  When the Russian Duma and President ratified START 
II in April-May 2000, Moscow attached several conditions on its entry into force (e.g., 
U.S. ratification of the 1997 ABM Treaty demarcation and succession agreements) that 
are likely to prove unacceptable to the United States Senate.  Moreover, the Bush 
Administration has proposed eschewing additional bilateral nuclear arms control treaties 
between Moscow and Washington in favor of pursuing less formal means of arms 
control.112    
A more likely military alternative would be for Russia to MIRV some of its new 
SS-27 TOPOL-M ICBMs.  The advantage to this approach is that it would cost 
significantly less to MIRV existing missiles than to build additional delivery systems.113  
Some analysts have concluded that it is within Russia’s economic potential to deploy up 
to 200 MIRVed SS-27 missiles (carrying three warheads each) by 2010.114  Given the 
above estimates that the aging Russian arsenal will decrease to between 1,000 and 1,500 
START-accountable warheads by 2010 without MIRVing, this means that MIRVed 
TOPOL-M ICBMs could bring Russia’s total warhead capacity up to approximately 
1,500-2,000.  This, of course, assumes that Russia can maintain its production targets for 
new SS-27s, which thus far it has not been able to do. 
Russia also could exploit countermeasures technologies, including penetration 
aids, at its disposal.  Most Russian missile systems already incorporate relatively 
sophisticated capabilities in this regard as compared to the weapons that a “rogue state” 
might produce without external assistance.  Depending on the level of sophistication of 
U.S. MD, Russian countermeasures might have to be improved.  It is unlikely, however, 
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that Russia would find this path simpler (or less expensive) than MIRVing existing 
missiles. 
Russian leaders could simply step up the alert status of their strategic forces in an 
effort to compensate for their decreasing numbers.  Retention of a launch on warning 
posture could be deemed necessary to increase the survivability of Russia’s second-strike 
capabilities.115  
The disturbing feature of each of Russia’s military posture options is that, rather 
than achieving Russian leaders’ objectives of restoring strategic stability with the United 
States, they might actually prove destabilizing.  For example, Alexander Savelyev of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences has made the point that “by all the standards of ‘strategic 
stability’ the deployment of MIRVed ICBMs is considered as destabilizing [a] move [as 
MD].”116  The reason for this resides in the increased incentives to strike first against an 
enemy’s MIRVed missiles because it is more cost-effective to destroy a MIRVed missile 
before its warheads separate.  As to the other military posture options, the aging of 
Russian missiles and command and control capabilities suggests that the retention of 
weapons past their obsolescence or placing them on high alert postures could be highly 
destabilizing, because the potential for accidents and malfunctions could increase. 
An alternative to confronting the perceived U.S. MD challenge through direct 
military posture steps could be an expansion of the proliferation of ballistic missile and 
WMD components and technology to other states.  Such a course might serve two 
purposes.  First, it would provide a relatively simple means for Russian leaders to 
complicate U.S. decision-making and to reduce U.S. MD’s effectiveness.  As a simple 
illustration, provision of basic countermeasures technologies to North Korea could 
significantly reduce U.S. confidence in MD reliability.  Second, it might provide revenue 
for the Russian defense industry. 
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Several difficulties with this option suggest, however, that its worth may be 
questionable from a Russian viewpoint.  Arms sales have not proven to be the economic 
panacea that the Russian defense industry had hoped.  Also, selling arms to Russia’s 
neighbors creates inherent risks for the country’s security.  For instance, arms sales could 
affect the regional balance of power in China’s favor.  Russia, by virtue of its geographic 
proximity, has far greater reason to feel threatened by nascent nuclear weapons states in 
areas such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia than does America.   
There is a potential diplomatic aspect as well.  A theme in Russia’s declared 
opposition to U.S. MD has been that MD will break down arms control regimes that 
promote nonproliferation.  It might be assumed that it would be politically difficult for 
Russia to engage in proliferation as a response to a system that Moscow had claimed was 
dangerous because it could lead to proliferation.  However, on balance such hypothetical 
diplomatic challenges are unlikely to inhibit Moscow, as Russian leaders have accepted 
logical inconsistencies in their proliferation and MD policies in the past.  As Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated—referring to the Russian MD position as articulated by Alexei Arbatov, 
the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma’s Defense Committee—during an August 
2001 interview: 
that position...is basically, “look, America, you establish a policy of 
remaining vulnerable to ballistic missiles while we are protected by a 
missile defense system in Moscow and while we continue to work with 
other countries like China and Iran and Iraq and various other countries 
with respect to proliferating some technologies that are not very helpful to 
the rest of the world.”117 
A range of diplomatic alternatives is available to Russian leaders should they 
choose to respond adversely to a U.S. MD deployment.  Perhaps the most alarming 
development (from a U.S. perspective) has been the series of Russian overtures for closer 
relations with China.  Russia and China have aligned against U.S. interests in various 
ways.  For example, Russia and China have coordinated efforts at curtailing U.S. MD in 
several important international fora such as the UN Conference on Disarmament, where 
jointly they have linked preservation of the ABM Treaty with important arms reduction 
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initiatives and treaties.  The July 2001 signing of a Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty 
(discussed in Chapter II), dramatically focused attention on the potential Sino-Russian 
bloc.   
However, obvious limits to Sino-Russian cooperation make an effective anti-
American alliance unlikely.  The two nations have a history of enmity and share a 2,500-
mile border that is not entirely stable (owing, among other factors, to migrations of ethnic 
Chinese into under-populated Russian territory).  Furthermore, both have greater 
economic stakes in good relations with the United States than with one another.  For 
instance, Sino-U.S. trade in 2000 was more than U.S. $100 billion, while Sino-Russian 
trade was less than U.S. $10 billion.118 
The most attractive diplomatic alternative available to Russian leaders, and the 
one likely to incur the least economic and diplomatic effort would be for Russia to simply 
withdraw from arms control reduction and verification regimes.  Such a course may be 
one of the few practical options available to Russian leaders.  Alexander Savelyev has 
suggested that apart from MIRVing some SS-27 missiles (as discussed above), “the only 
real ‘instrument,’ which Russia is able to use against the United States under present 
conditions is to block all kinds of information, which is flowing in accordance with arms 
control agreements.”119  Moreover, as noted earlier, withdrawal from arms control 
agreements may suit Russian elites’ preexisting preferences, as some Russian military 
authorities view U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as a vehicle to escape the 
restrictions of the START I and INF Treaties.120 
The challenge to U.S. leaders in such circumstances would be the additional 
uncertainties that would be created.  It is important to note, however, that such actions 
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could also prove harmful to Russia in that they could end programs such as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction activity, and potentially disrupt other forms of U.S.-
Russian cooperation. 
Russia does have a range of options available to it should it choose to react 
adversely to a U.S. MD deployment.  This range, however, is severely limited by 
economic factors and/or diplomatic considerations.  In terms of traditional concepts of 
arms competition, the most likely options assessed here would be withdrawal from arms 
reduction regimes and some adjustments in force posture (e.g., MIRVing SS-27 ICBMs, 
retaining some older MIRVed ICBMs and enhancing the alert posture).  The likelihood of 
an offensive arms buildup (e.g., a significant increase in delivery systems) is remote at 
best, however. 
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
Russian opposition to U.S. MD has likely been guided by numerous 
considerations.  Trends of the post-Cold War era have placed the Russian state in an 
increasingly weak and defensive role vis-à-vis the West.  Russian hopes for rapid 
democratization and acceptance as a major player in the Euro-Atlantic region have been 
disappointed.  In the wake of sustained and severe economic and military decline, events 
such as the Kosovo War have helped to highlight (in Russian eyes) Russia’s diminishing 
influence in international affairs and the new levels of U.S. ascendancy.  Furthermore, as 
other measures of Russian power have declined, military power (most especially nuclear 
strength) has taken on increased significance in a state accustomed historically to equate 
military might with regime legitimacy. 
The potential consequences of such trends for U.S. MD deployment are that:  (a) 
Russian leaders may mistakenly believe that U.S. MD is aimed at Russia, (b) Russia may 
assess U.S. MD as a threat to Russian security, and (c) Russian leaders may fear that U.S. 
MD will threaten Russia’s sole remaining claim to superpower status—its nuclear might.  
Arms race theory suggests that any of these perceptions could create incentives for arms 
competition.   
Russia’s capacity to engage in arms competition is severely limited by its 
economic condition.  It seems highly unlikely that a vertical arms race with the United 
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States is possible in the foreseeable future.  This does not mean that Russia is without 
options, however.  Of the range of military and diplomatic alternatives available to 
Russian leaders the most likely course would be withdrawal from arms reduction and 
verification regimes in combination with relatively minor adjustments to Russia’s 
strategic force posture (e.g., MIRVing SS-27 ICBMs and maintaining higher alert 
postures).     
On balance, it appears that considerations of Russian prestige may underlie many 
of the Russian leaders’ objections to MD.  In fact, prestige issues may be fueling Russian 
perceptions of U.S. hegemonism and strategic threat.  This common thread may offer 
insight into the potential for success of the current efforts to achieve a U.S.-Russian 
compromise over MD.  
In this regard, the 22 July 2001 joint statement made by Presidents Bush and 
Putin may prove to be a significant turning point: 
We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of 
both offensive and defensive systems.  We already have some strong and 
tangible points of agreement.  We will shortly begin intensive 
consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive 
systems.121 
By dealing with Putin as an equal, President Bush is granting important recognition of 
Russia’s status as a major world power.  Furthermore, by linking U.S.-Russian offensive 
arms reduction talks with MD consultations, Presidents Bush and Putin may both be able 
to declare a diplomatic victory.  “Putin has to bring something home to soothe the 
generals, placate public opinion, and ease the crisis of Russian security.  Sharp reductions 
in the United States strategic arsenal would be undeniably good for Russian security and 
would be seen as a political victory for Putin.”122  At the same time, by winning Russian 
acceptance for U.S. MD deployments, President Bush can address some of the main 
concerns of domestic and European opponents of MD.   
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The prospects for the present consultations hold some promise, despite serious 
continuing disagreements, because they deal with the key concerns of Russian leaders 
described in this chapter.  It is noteworthy that during a press briefing on the September 
2001 U.S.-Russian MD consultations Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, Deputy Chief of 
the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, had the following to say regarding what Russia 
might do if the United States unilaterally withdraws from the ABM Treaty:  
It will continue the dialogue on the new strategic relationship...I hope we 
[the United States and Russia] are expressing a common point of view that 
these confidential relations will continue in any form.  The withdrawal of 
the United States from the ABM Treaty will not cancel these relations that 
will continue because we live in a world where you can’t solve problems 
except on this basis.123  
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The United States government intends to deploy missile defenses to protect 
America and its allies from the emerging ballistic missile threat posed by “rogue” states.  
This danger to U.S. national security is significant and growing.  President Bush made 
clear the current U.S. course in his May 2001 address at the National Defense University: 
To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and 
friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that 
we can destroy those who seek to destroy us.  This is an important 
opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new 
ways to keep the peace...We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on 
both offensive and defensive forces.  Deterrence can no longer be based 
solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.124  
This new direction for U.S. policy has inherent risks that should be considered.  The goal 
of enhanced U.S. national security may not be achieved if U.S. deployment of MD incites 
increased animosities with Russia.  In view of this risk, this thesis has attempted to assess 
what Russian reactions to a U.S. MD deployment might be.  The thesis has examined 
both the incentives driving Russian decision-making and the economic and military 
capacity of Russia to engage the United States in arms competition. 
In concluding this thesis, two questions remain to be discussed.  First, what are 
the potential implications for U.S. policy of the Russian case study findings?  Second, 
what areas for further research are suggested by this analysis? 
A.  FINDINGS AND U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The declaratory policies and actions of Russian leaders have, until very recently, 
indicated strong opposition to U.S. plans to deploy a MD capability.  U.S. MD 
proponents have argued that:  (a) U.S. intentions in seeking a MD system are clear; and 
(b) U.S. MD poses no threat to Russia’s huge nuclear arsenal.  However, several factors 
have contributed to Russian concerns over U.S. MD.    
Key U.S. decisions in the 1990s helped to foster a Russian view that U.S. 
intentions have become increasingly aggressive and hegemonic.  NATO expansion and 
the United States-led NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict in March-June 1999 
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appear to have contributed to Russian perceptions of a growing U.S. threat.  NATO’s 
Kosovo intervention in particular exacerbated a belief that Russia had lost influence in 
international politics.  It also encouraged the perception (however mistaken) that the 
United States and its allies were willing to act outside the constraints of international law 
to achieve their political objectives, because the NATO allies used force without an 
explicit UN Security Council resolution authorizing them to do so.  
Concomitant with growing Russian apprehensions over U.S. intentions, Russia 
experienced dramatic economic decline in the 1990s; and this likely served to further 
aggravate Russian feelings of vulnerability.  With an economy faring little better today 
than that of many Third World states, in economic terms Russia has become a secondary 
power.  Moreover, this trend does not appear likely to abate in the near term given the 
lack of the institutions necessary to end rampant corruption in Russia and bring about 
fundamental economic reforms.  As other indicators of strength have deteriorated (e.g., 
economic and diplomatic influence), military strength—in particular, nuclear might—has 
arguably become Russia’s sole remaining claim to superpower status.  To the extent that 
U.S. MD diminishes this bulwark of Russia’s military posture and this last vestige of 
Russian great power status, at least in Russian eyes, it poses a serious threat to Russia’s 
national security and international standing. 
Arms race theory suggests that the above dynamics could create strong incentives 
for Russian arms race activity following a U.S. MD deployment.  Although Russian 
abilities to engage in arms competition are limited, Russian leaders have a range of 
diplomatic and military posture responses available to them that could significantly affect 
U.S. national security. 
Although this thesis has not surveyed an all-inclusive list of potentially relevant 
factors, it has concluded that incentives created by misperceptions of aggressive intent, 
calculations of strategic vulnerability, and concerns about national prestige may be the 
most significant factors.  On balance, the issue of prestige appears to dominate.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that these three incentives are linked to a large degree.  Issues of 
prestige, for example, likely fuel Russian perceptions of U.S. aggressive intentions and 
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encourage greater attention to calculations of the strategic balance.  These findings 
suggest three important areas of focus for U.S. MD policy vis-à-vis Russia. 
First, increased clarity and transparency in U.S.-Russian MD discourse are 
essential to curb Russian perceptions of U.S. aggressive intent.  In this regard, diplomatic 
efforts such as the United States hosting of a conference for senior members of the 
Russian military staff in August 2001 to better explain U.S. MD plans (in terms of 
architecture and capabilities) have been extremely promising.125   
Second, the extent of U.S. MD deployment should be weighed in light of:  (a) 
U.S. objectives of eliminating threats of coercion, blackmail and attack from nascent 
missile states; and (b) Russia’s concerns over strategic vulnerability.  Although this 
analysis has concluded that it is unlikely that any presently conceived level of U.S. MD 
capability could negate the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent over the coming decade, 
the impact of U.S. MD on Russia’s nuclear capabilities could be significant under certain 
conditions and could increase over time.  This insight suggests that a degree of restraint 
in U.S. MD deployment may be advisable in order to minimize the potential for adverse 
Russian reactions.  Given the limited technological and material resources of most “rogue 
states,” a balance should be achievable—with respect to U.S. MD deployment levels—to 
reconcile the goals of (a) countering the threat of emerging missile states and (b) pursuing 
enhanced relations with Russia.   
Third, Russian concerns about diminishing international prestige may be partially 
alleviated simply through continued dealings with Russia’s leaders.  The Bush 
Administration has already taken several important steps in this regard.  The July 2001 
G8 Conference in Genoa sent a clear signal that the United States, while resolved to 
pursue MD, views Russian security concerns as important.   
By linking U.S. offensive arms reductions with further MD consultations, the 
above three areas of potential U.S.-Russian compromise are being addressed in parallel 
by the Bush Administration.  First, the focus on increased dialogue and information 
exchanges has likely aided in reducing Russian apprehensions about U.S. intentions.  
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Second, U.S. offensive arms reductions in conjunction with MD deployment may serve 
to alleviate Russian perceptions of a growing U.S.-Russian strategic imbalance. Most 
significantly, when U.S. leaders treat Russian leaders as virtually equal partners at the 
bargaining table, they are implicitly recognizing Russia’s major power status. 
It remains to be seen if the present U.S.-Russian consultations will be successful.  
Periods of apparent rapprochement in the past have ended in dispute.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, for example, plans for U.S.-Russian cooperation in developing a Global 
Protection System showed significant promise in the early 1990s, but were abandoned by 
the Clinton Administration.  The analysis in this thesis, however, supports the conclusion 
that the Bush Administration’s current strategy for addressing Russian security concerns 
has significant potential for achieving a breakthrough in the highly contentious U.S.-
Russian debate over missile defenses. 
B.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Three areas are recommended for further research.  First, several factors 
potentially influencing Russian reactions to U.S. MD could be addressed in greater depth.  
Chapter II briefly described the role of intra-state forces (e.g., institutional and 
bureaucratic actors) in contributing to state decision-making.  Insofar as the reactions of 
Russian leaders to U.S MD do not merely reflect monolithic views of the state, the 
various domestic pressures and negotiations taking place in Russia need to be considered 
when assessing U.S. MD policy options.  For example, the significant influence of 
Russian military and military-industrial elites may loom large in Russian policy choices 
with regard to MD. 
Second, the analysis of U.S. MD’s likely effectiveness and impact on U.S.-
Russian strategic relations was limited in this assessment by a paucity of available 
unclassified data concerning U.S. MD plans.  As the Bush Administration’s plans for MD 
are clarified, and the potential effectiveness of MD becomes understood with greater 
precision through the course of further testing and development, more detailed analyses 
of the potential impact of U.S. MD on Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capability 
should be conducted. 
63 
Finally, the analytical framework utilized in this thesis may be useful in assessing 
the potential reactions of other states concerned by a U.S. MD deployment.  In particular, 
the reactions of China to U.S. MD could be important for U.S. national security.  
Although Russia is viewed with greatest concern in the near term, due to its possession of 
nuclear forces capable of utterly destroying the American homeland, China’s growing 
economic and military strength could pose a long-term threat to U.S. interests.  The 
declaratory positions of Chinese leaders have been remarkably similar to those of Russian 
elites with regard to U.S. MD.  This suggests that many of the arms competition 
incentives outlined in Chapter II could play a role in shaping Chinese policy choices.  
There are, of course, many differences between the Russian and Chinese cases (e.g., 
divergent cultural and historical contexts, and differing strategic objectives).  A detailed 
assessment of Chinese reactions, utilizing a methodology similar to that employed by this 
thesis, might prove helpful in understanding the unique aspects of the Chinese case.  
Thus, one might identify ways to minimize the prospect of arms competition with this 
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APPENDIX A.  TECHNICAL COMPONENTS DEPLOYED AT 
EACH STAGE OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
The Bush Administration’s plan for U.S. MD has yet to be announced.  
Furthermore, many elements of the system (e.g., test schedules, architecture, and alliance 
participation) are still in the development phase.  Given these caveats, however, some 
basic assumptions about the potential MD deployment progression may be deduced by 
referring to the Clinton Administration’s plans.  Two independent MD program 
assessments were conducted in 2000—one by the United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) and the other by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).126  These 
assessments provide unclassified details about the component specifications and expected 
deployment timing for the threshold capability 1 (C1), expanded C1, and capability 3 
(C3) utilized in the Chapter III Russian case study.  The data are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Levels of MD Capability Through 2011 
 
                                                 
126 See United States General Accounting Office, Missile Defense: Status of the National Missile 
Defense Program (Washington, D.C.:  General Accounting Office, May 2000) 15; and Congressional 
Budget Office, “Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration’s Plan for National Missile 
Defense,” Congressional Budget Office Homepage, April 2000, 10 August 2001 
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1984&sequence=0&from=5>.   
Threshold C1 Expanded C1 C3 
Interceptors 20 100 250 
Launch Sitesa 1 1 2 
X-Band Radars 1 1 9 
Upgraded Early Warning Radars 5 5 6 
Communications Facilities 3 3 5 
Early-Warning Satellites 
(SBIRS-high)b 2 4 5 
Warhead-Tracking Satellites 
(SBIRS-low) 0 6 24 
Deployment Date 2005 2007 2011 
After: Congressional Budget Office and General Accounting Office Studies 
a. Number of “kill vehicles” and their associated booster rockets 
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